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Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate the consumer welfare eﬀects of entry into residential local
phone service in New York State using household-level data. Since residential local phone
service is sold under a menu of two-part tariﬀs, we develop a method for estimating a mixed
discrete/continuous demand model. The econometric model incorporates the simultaneity
of the discrete plan and continuous consumption choices by consumers and allows for ﬂat-
rate plans, bundling of services, and unobservable ﬁrm quality. Since utility maximization
underlies our model, we are able to estimate welfare eﬀects from the introduction of ad-
ditional choices or changes of product features. We use the model to evaluate the eﬀect
of entry by the two largest competitive local exchange carriers in the New York market
from the third quarter of 1999 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2003. Residential local phone service
competition is an important goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and we provide one
of the most detailed evaluations of its eﬀect on consumer welfare. Our results indicate that
relative to what it would have paid to Verizon, the average household switching to AT&T
or MCI saved at least 4.3% and 1.9%, respectively, ignoring quantity and observed and
unobserved quality eﬀects from switching. In total, we ﬁnd preliminarily that the average
household gained 19.3% of the average Verizon bill from the availability of new plan and
provider choices.
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1 Introduction
As a result of the 1996 Telecommunications Act (the “1996 Act”), the market for lo-
cal residential and business phone service was opened to competition. By the end of the
1990s many cities in the United States had experience with local exchange competition in
the form of Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (“CLECs”).1 Recent studies (Crandall
and Sidak 2002, and Zolnierek, Eisner and Burton 2001) highlight the role of economic
factors, such as demand and cost diﬀerences across markets, economies of geographic
scope, and regulatory stringency, in driving entry into local telecommunications mar-
kets. Greenstein and Mazzeo (2003) ﬁnd furthermore that product diﬀerentiation is an
important consideration in the ﬁrms’ entry decision, suggesting that entry may beneﬁt
consumers in the form of both increased price competition and higher product variety.
While the determinants of entry into local telecommunications markets have re-
ceived some attention, the eﬀect of such entry on consumer welfare is to date unclear.
Early estimates of the expected savings by consumers as a result of CLEC entry are
signiﬁcant. Data compiled by TRAC (2001a) suggests that New York State customers
may be able to save between $2.06 and $5.32 on their local phone bill, generating an
estimated $197 million in annual savings for customers who switched from Verizon to a
CLEC or switched to Verizon’s long-distance oﬀerings. (See also TRAC 2001b for ex-
pected savings of competition in local service in California.) This paper extends their
analysis to evaluate the consumer welfare eﬀects of entry into residential local phone
service in New York State using detailed household-level data. In contrast to the TRAC
study, we are able to quantify the eﬀects of entry on consumer welfare based on actual
consumer choices rather than hypothetical consumer migrations. The household-level
data set also allows us to model individual choice behavior and to distinguish between
welfare eﬀects generated by lower prices and by increased product variety post-entry.
Residential local phone service is sold under a menu of two-part tariﬀs where
consumers must choose a pricing plan for which they pay a ﬁxed fee and then decide
their quantity choice based on a per-unit price. In estimating local telecommunications
demand, the presence of two-part tariﬀs has been accommodated in several ways. Train,
McFadden and Ben-Akiva (1987) employ a nested logit structure to estimate demand
for local phone service in which each nest is a combination of a plan and a portfolio of
calls (number and distance). To reduce the immense number of possible portfolios, the
authors randomly sample a selected number of portfolios.
Miravete (2002a, 2002b) infers the distribution of consumers’ utility for local
phone calls by incorporating the time lag between the initial plan choice and the subse-
quent usage decision. Based on data from an experiment in Kentucky in which consumers
were able to choose among diﬀerent types of plans in one city but not in another, Mi-
1Greenstein and Mazzeo (2003) state that as of 1999, in 56% of the markets that experienced entry,
one entrant competes with the incumbent, in 28% of the markets, between two and ﬁve entrants compete,
while only 8% of the markets witnessed the entry of more than 10 new providers.
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ravete (2002a) is able to identify diﬀerences in the distribution of consumer types before
and after the plan choice and analyze the extent to which the local phone company is
able to discriminate amongst its customers based on the separation of the plan choice
from the usage decision. His work complements work by Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997)
who estimate a structural model of optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolistic phone
company. Miravete (2002b) studies the eﬀect that the uncertainty over usage has on
the initial plan choice. He ﬁnds that consumers make, on average, the correct tariﬀ
choice conditional on their realized consumption, despite their uncertain usage, and that
consumers frequently switch calling plans with the goal of minimizing cost of service in
response to small diﬀerences in billing cost.2
This evidence suggests that local phone service consumers act rationally in their
choice of calling plan, as assumed by Hausman, Tardiﬀ and Belinfante (1993) in their
mixed discrete-continuous model of local telecommunications demand. In their model,
consumers choose both a single service provider as well as the quantity of the service they
consume. Such mixed discrete-continuous models apply to markets with two-part tariﬀs
in general, including telecommunications, energy, information and Internet access indus-
tries. Due to a lack of usage data, Hausman, Tardiﬀ and Belinfante (1993) estimate only
the discrete portion of the model to study penetration of local phone service in the U.S.,
but the discrete choice incorporates the continuous choice consistent with utility maxi-
mization. Narayanan, Chintagunta and Miravete (2004) use a mixed discrete-continuous
model of demand similar to the one used in this paper to study the extent of consumer
learning about usage after the introduction of an optional metered tariﬀ. In contrast to
their setting, the plan oﬀerings in our data set remained virtually unchanged both prior
to and during our sample period and any consumer learning is therefore likely to have
occurred already. Instead, we focus on the eﬀect of competition on consumers plan and
usage choices.
We develop a demand model that incorporates the joint decisions over discrete
tariﬀ choices and continuous consumption levels by consumers. Our utility speciﬁcation
accounts for several institutional features, including “all you can eat” ﬂat-rate plans at
zero marginal price and bundling of local and intraLATA toll services. To allow for dif-
ferentiation among providers, we incorporate unobserved ﬁrm quality diﬀerences as hor-
izontal provider attributes to account for the empirical regularity that some households
switch under higher prices while others do not. The resulting utility function is the prim-
itive of our econometric model. The demand functions implied by utility maximization
deﬁne the optimal quantity choice for all options. Based on these optimal consumption
levels we then compare consumers’ indirect utility to determine their discrete choice of
2His ﬁndings contradict earlier work (Hobson and Spady, 1988; Kling and van der Ploeg, 1990) that
documents that a signiﬁcant fraction of customers appear to show a bias towards subscribing to a ﬂat
tariﬀ option, even if their usage is too low to justify the choice rationally. Most of this evidence comes
from data collected at a time shortly after the introduction of optional local metered service and, as
Miravete (2002b) argues, such biases may result as a transitory side eﬀect of understanding a new tariﬀ
option.
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a calling plan. Our methodology allows for unobserved household diﬀerences to enter
the demand function and indirect utility in a manner consistent with utility maximiza-
tion. We employ a simulated method of moments estimation technique that combines
the information from the discrete and continuous choices by consumers.
This paper ﬁts into the recent literature on the estimation of mixed discrete-
continuous models of demand. Hanemann (1984) provides a comprehensive methodology
for estimating discrete/continuous econometric models that link the discrete and contin-
uous choices in the same utility maximization problem. Chiang and Lee (1992) allow
further for zero consumption of the inside good. Building upon earlier empirical studies
(Dubin and McFadden 1984, Dubin 1985), Chiang (1991) estimates this demand model
using coﬀee purchase data and allowing for the no-purchase option. A number of recent
papers (Chan 2003, Dube´ 2003, Hendel 1999, and Kim, Allenby and Rossi 2002) con-
sider scenarios in which households choose an optimal bundle of products during any one
purchase occasion, instead of making a series of independent choice decisions. Hendel
(1999), for example, estimates a multiple-discrete model of demand in which consumers
simultaneously choose which and how many discrete units of a set of products to purchase
and applies the estimation to purchases of personal computers. Similar to our approach,
Kim, Allenby and Rossi (2002) derive optimal demand across a discrete set of goods from
the household’s direct utility function and apply their methodology to yogurt purchases.
The fact that households can choose a combination of products at varying quantities
makes their model very computationally intensive, even for small numbers of products.
In contrast, both the institutional setting and the two-part tariﬀ nature of pricing in
local telecommunications imply that households choose one exclusive provider for their
local telephone service, greatly simplifying the analysis.
We estimate our model using data for a random sample of households in New
York State from the third quarter of 1999 through the ﬁrst quarter of 2003. Signiﬁcant
CLEC entry occurred in New York State during our sample period. The largest entrants
are AT&T and MCI, which together comprised 85% of the residential lines served by
entrants at the end of 2001. Along with AT&T and MCI, we include the incumbents
Verizon, Citizens Telecommunications and Rochester Telephone, representing 97% of
lines served by incumbents, in our analysis. The supply side of the local phone market is
unique in that entrants lease parts of the incumbents’ infrastructure and regulators set
the incumbents’ prices, limiting the ability for supply-side responses. Instead, we focus
exclusively on the welfare eﬀects on consumers.
We consider four types of consumer welfare eﬀects. Price and quantity eﬀects arise
due to price diﬀerences between entrants and the incumbent, which beneﬁt consumers
in the form of pure price eﬀects and also elicit a demand response, the quantity eﬀect.
Firms may also oﬀer diﬀerentiated services, beneﬁting consumers in the form of variety
increases. We call this result of entry the “quality eﬀect.” Last, households may also ben-
eﬁt due to their ability to combine separate services under one bill if they were to switch
to an entrant that is also their long-distance provider. This convenience eﬀect makes up
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the last category of consumer welfare eﬀects. The estimation of the households’ utility
function allows us to assess the importance of price, quantity, quality, and convenience
eﬀects due to entry. We perform a counterfactual in which only the incumbent’s plans
are available to the households and force households to choose the optimal plan available
from the ILEC. We then decompose the changes in indirect utility into the four diﬀerent
types of consumer welfare changes due to the introduction of the entrants’ plans.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant heterogeneity across households in the eﬀect of entry. Because
some households incur higher monetary charges after switching to an entrant, we allow for
observed and unobserved ﬁrm quality. Our estimation procedure allows us to disaggregate
pure price eﬀects, usage eﬀects, convenience eﬀects and quality eﬀects from entry. Our
results indicate that based on price eﬀects alone, the average household switching to
AT&T saved 4.3% relative to what they would have paid on Verizon ignoring quantity,
observed and unobserved quality eﬀects, while the corresponding savings of the average
household using MCI’s local service amount to only 1.9%.3 Based on the individual
switching behavior of households we ﬁnd evidence that observed and unobserved ﬁrm
quality plays an important role in households’ discrete carrier choices but do not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant evidence of uncertainty of consumer demand or that households systematically
make “mistakes” in choosing plans. We preliminarily quantify these quality gains and
the total gains from entry to amount to 10.2% and 19.3%, respectively.
2 Local Telephone Services and Entry
2.1 Regulatory Background
Divestiture of AT&T in 1984 was very successful in creating a competitive market for
long-distance telephone service. At the same time, it established seven Regional Bell
Operating Companies (“RBOCs”) (Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Bell South, NYNEX, Pa-
ciﬁc Bell, SouthWestern Bell, and US West) as monopolists of local telephone service,
each in its own geographic region. An important goal of the 1996 Act was to relax their
monopoly power and instead encourage competition in the local telecommunications ser-
vices market. The 1996 Act relies on competition and deregulation as means to encourage
investment in privately owned communications infrastructure and the widespread deploy-
ment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies (such as broadband
service).4 Consumers would beneﬁt from prices being pushed towards cost, higher quality
3These savings compare to savings of 8 to 11% on long-distance bills that Hausman, Leonard and
Sidak (2002) estimate to have accrued to consumers after the entry of incumbent local exchange carriers
(“ILECs”) into long-distance service in New York and Texas during the late 1990s. The study is based
on the TNS Bill Harvesting data that we employ as well, using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach to
compare the experiences of New York and Texas to Pennsylvania and California, respectively, both of
which did not experience entry by ILECs into long-distance service during the same time period.
4For a more detailed discussion of the 1996 Act, see Economides (1999).
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of service, and greater variety in the form of new service oﬀerings.
Entry into local service is complicated by the high capital requirements to build
the local loop that connects the customer to the network. To help entrants overcome
these diﬃculties, the 1996 Act mandated that the ILECs must grant entrants access to
its infrastructure. The Act views such service-based entry as an intermediary step to
full-ﬂedged facilities-based entry (where ﬁrms provide their own infrastructure). The
goal is to allow new competitors access to the market, who over time will build their own
facilities in areas where it is eﬃcient and rely less on cooperation with the ILEC as their
own networks develop.
Under service-based entry, entrants are able to lease the ILEC’s infrastructure
at cost-based rates set by each state’s public service (or utility) commission (“PSC”).
Entrants are allowed to choose which individual unbundled network elements (“UNEs”)
or platform combination of UNEs of the ILEC’s infrastructure they would like to lease:
loops, switching, and transport. An alternative way of entry is through total service
resale wherein the entrant buys the ﬁnal service of the incumbent, except for retailing
and billing functions, adds its own retailing and billing, and sells it to ﬁnal customers.
Although entrants can enter the market as facilities-based entrants, most entry into the
residential market has been through the lease of UNEs or through total service resale,5
given the high costs of running a second line to the customer’s home or establishing
switching facilities relative to the cost of leasing existing lines and facilities.6
The PSC serves two main roles in residential local phone competition. First, it sets
the lease rates that entrants pay to the ILECs for UNEs. UNE rates vary by geographic
zone within New York State based on line density in the wire center. During our sample
period, UNE rates were revised signiﬁcantly only once, in July 2002. To facilitate further
entry, the PSC reduced rates by on average 30% from earlier levels. The cost of serving
the average household in New York was approximately $20 as of early 2001 and fell to
approximately $15 in July 2002.7
Second, the PSC regulates the rates that the ILEC charges residential customers
for local phone services. Until March 2002, the PSC used a performance regulatory
5In New York as of December 31, 2002, CLECs reported that 67.4% of their 3.19 million switched
access lines (residential and business) were served via UNEs, while only 13.8% were served through their
own facilities and 18.8% through the resale of an ILEC’s service (“Local Telephone Competition,” FCC
June 2003). This understates the percentage of residential lines served via UNEs since CLECs are more
likely to use their own facilities for higher-volume business customers.
6This so-called “last mile” installation is estimated to cost several thousand dollars per home de-
pending on the remoteness and terrain. In the context of broadband deployment, NECA (2000) found
that the estimated cost of upgrading 3.3 million lines in rural areas amounted to $10.9 billion dollars.
Approximately half of that total was associated with upgrading lines serving customers situated in areas
that are either very remote or situated in diﬃcult terrain.
7Based on Appendices 2 and 3 in http://www.cad.state.wv.us/Intro%20to%20Matrix%201-02.htm.
The cost ﬁgures assume 1000 minutes of usage per month and incorporate discounts for leasing the entire
platform of UNEs.
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framework based on revenue targets. Prices that Verizon, the primary New York ILEC,
could charge for basic service were held constant until Sept. 2000 and reduced thereafter
to achieve the predetermined revenue target. From March 2002, the PSC changed its
regulatory regime to one of incentive regulation that granted Verizon a certain degree
of pricing ﬂexibility and retail rate increases to allow it to recover some of the revenue
foregone due to the decreased UNE rates. Table 1 summarizes Verizon’s prices across
geographic areas and over time. Due to the continued regulated nature of pricing by
the PSC, Verizon’s ability to adjust prices in response to entry was therefore limited,
in particular in the pre-2002 period. Even under the new regulatory regime, Verizon
does not appear to overtly use price ﬂexibly as a competitive instrument since it simply
adopted the maximum price levels set forth by the PSC.
A separate component of Verizon’s incentive regulation relates to service quality.
To prevent service deterioration, the PSC established performance objectives in ﬁve ser-
vice quality areas (customer trouble report rates, customers out-of-service over 24 hours,
installation performance, PSC complaints, and other measures related to the PSC’s Ser-
vice Standards). Failure to meet any of the performance objectives results in credits to
the aﬀected customers. Due to the incentives placed by this regulatory scheme on Veri-
zon to maintain and improve its service quality, it is diﬃcult to isolate eﬀects that entry
may have on quality levels. Instead, we concentrate on households’ perceived quality
diﬀerences between providers as implied by their actual provider choices.
2.2 Competitors in New York State
Formed by Bell Atlantic’s acquisition of NYNEX in 1997 and a subsequent merger with
GTE in 1998, Verizon was the dominant ILEC in New York during the time period of
our sample. Verizon had 9.462 million (89%) of the 10.639 million access lines (business
and residential) in New York State served by ILECs as of December 31, 2001. Two other
independent ILECs, Rochester Telephone of New York and Citizens Telecommunications,
had most of the remaining access lines, 0.496 million (5%) and 0.316 million (3%) re-
spectively. Rochester Telephone and Citizens Telecommunications merged in June 2001
to form Frontier Communications of New York. Figure 1 displays the geographic areas
served by these three New York ILECs.
The incumbents’ share of access lines declined consistently over our sample period
as the CLECs’ market share of residential lines increased from 6% in 1999 to 22% in 2002.
New York State experienced competition in local service even before the 1996 Act with
Rochester Telephone’s opening of its local market to competition on January 1, 1995.
The two main entrants during our sample period, and the largest to date, were AT&T
and MCI, both of which expanded into local service from the long-distance market. As
of December 31, 2001, AT&T served 0.975 million (58%) and MCI 0.462 million (27%)
of the 1.684 million residential access lines served by CLECs in New York. The initial
wave of entry in New York State by AT&T occurred in 1999 and is displayed in Figure 2.
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In 2001, AT&T entererd into the remainder of Verizon’s territory. MCI similarly entered
only into Verizon’s territory and began oﬀering service in the entire territory as of 1999.
2.3 Local Service Markets and Products
Each household that subscribes to telephone service is connected, at the most disaggre-
gate geographic level, to a wire center, the location of one or more switching systems
where customer loops converge. Wire center areas diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the population
served, with the average New York State wire center serving 27,860 people (median of
5,324), ranging from 126 people in Blue Mountain Lake’s wire center to 1.7 million peo-
ple in New York City’s Zone 6. Importantly for our estimation, wire centers are deﬁned
identically for all the carriers given the technological constraints of transmitting a call.
We treat as market areas collections of wire centers in which telephone prices, provider
choices, and services are the same. These will be deﬁned in more detail in section 5
below.
Wire centers are in turn grouped into local access transport areas (“LATAs”),
seven of which are in New York State. Within each LATA, two types of calls are dis-
tinguished. Local service denotes all calls made to wire centers within a local calling
area. IntraLATA toll calls, in contrast, are calls made to wire centers outside of the local
calling area but within the household’s LATA. Even though carriers deﬁne local calling
area themselves, they are deﬁned identically across carriers. Calls terminating outside of
the LATA are considered long-distance calls whether terminating within or outside the
state.
The 1996 Act deﬁned opening the local telecommunications market to competition
as a precondition for allowing RBOCs to enter the long-distance market in their region.
By the end of our sample period, the major local service incumbents in New York,
Verizon and Frontier Communications, operated in the long-distance market. Verizon
received regulatory approval to enter the New York long-distance market in January
2000 having taken the necessary steps to open its local market to competition,8 while
Frontier Communications has oﬀered long-distance service in the Rochester market since
January 1995. Long-distance service was for the most part not bundled with local phone
service during the time of our study in the sense of the two services substituting for each
other in the calls allowed in a calling plan. Our study thus concentrates on estimating
the beneﬁts from competition in local and intraLATA service.
Local and intraLATA phone service is provisioned through monthly calling plans,
most of which are some variation of a two- or three-part tariﬀ. The New York carriers
generally oﬀer three types of plans. Metered plans charge a monthly fee to obtain service
8Verizon was subject to the long-distance restrictions inherited from its RBOC parts (NYNEX and
Bell Atlantic), even though GTE, never having been part of AT&T, was not restricted from providing
long-distance service.
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and a per call fee for usage, which may diﬀer for local and intraLATA calls. Flat-rate (or
“all you can eat”) plans charge a monthly fee and allow unlimited calling. Hybrid plans
are three-part tariﬀs in which households pay a monthly fee to obtain a certain number of
calls at zero marginal price. For calls above the pre-deﬁned number of calls, a household
pays a positive marginal price. The FCC also requires local carriers to oﬀer additional
plans for qualifying low-income households, called Lifeline plans.9,10 These plans provide
reduced rates for calling plans.
Local phone service providers also oﬀered so-called vertical features, such as call
waiting, call forwarding, three-way calling, and speed dialing, to its customers. During
the time period of our study, the carriers did not bundle these features with local or
intraLATA toll service. Instead they oﬀered them as additional features that could be
purchased along with the basic services. We describe how we accommodate vertical
features in Section 5.
3 Data
We analyze the choices of a sample of New York State households collected by TNS Tele-
coms (TNS). TNS’ Bill Harvesting data contains survey data from residential customers.
TNS gathers various demographic information on the household and asks them to submit
their actual phone bill. Since willingness to respond varies by household characteristics,
TNS employs oversampling to obtain a random sample of households in New York State.
Our sample runs from September 1999 through March 2003 and covers a total of 7,222
household observations.
For each household, the data set contains information on its local carrier choice
and any detailed line items recorded on its local telephone bill. Because the format of
telephone bills varies across carriers and plans, the detailed information from the bill
varies by household but generally includes the services the household purchased, total
amount paid and a breakdown of the bill into services, fees and regulatory charges. If
the household is on a metered plan we know the number of calls consumed, but if it is
on a ﬂat-rate plan, the local usage is generally not available.11 From the demographic
survey completed by the household we know basic demographic information as well as
information on other telecommunications services and technology products used by the
household. The household’s income is reported as categorical variables. To transform it
9In New York, a household qualiﬁes if it receives beneﬁts from any one of the following programs:
Food Stamps, Home Energy Assistance Programs, Family Assistance, Medicaid, Safety Net Assistance,
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Veteran’s Disability Pension or Veteran’s Surviving Spouse Pension.
If the household is not part of any of these programs it can also qualify by providing proof of income to
the carrier.
10There is also a separate program called Linkup which provides a discount for initiating service but
we do not address this since we ignore set-up costs to service for all households.
11We also know usage for a household on a hybrid plan that exceeded the threshold.
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into a single continuous variable, we assigned to each household an income equal to a
predicted average income level in its category, as described in more detail in the appendix.
We use the household’s location, available at the zip code and wire center levels, together
with tariﬀ data on the availability of AT&T and MCI’s local service by rate center and
time period, to construct the household’s choice set of local service carriers at the time
of their bill.
The TNS data does not directly identify the calling plan chosen by the household.
We are however able to use descriptions of services contained in the TNS ﬁles along with
information on the household’s expenditures to uniquely identify its calling plan based
on publicly available information. All carriers must ﬁle rate-related information with the
PSC and must update these tariﬀs whenever prices change. The universe of calling plans
and their prices at every point in time during our sample period is available from these
PSC tariﬀ ﬁlings. In contrast to long-distance service where optional calling plans are
frequently updated, the tariﬀ options and their features have remained constant over the
period of our sample (although a few new plans have been introduced). Since providers
adjust consumers’ bills to reﬂect price changes as they go into eﬀect, we identify each
household’s plan among contemporaneous tariﬀs. Across providers, we are able to match
97.2% of households to a calling plan.
Some simpliﬁcations of the data were necessary to make estimation tractable.
Some calling plans price usage based on number of minutes rather than number of calls.
Using the inventory of calls placed by each household contained in the TNS data, we
converted per-minute to per-call usage based on the average length of a local call across
all households in the sample. Other calling plans charge diﬀerential prices for the ﬁrst
minute of a call versus additional minutes. We set the per-call price paid by households
on these plans to a weighted average rate using the fraction of calls lasting less than one
minute and the average length of calls lasting more than one minute. Prices on some
calling plans also varied by time of day (day versus evening versus night/weekend) and
were similarly changed to a weighted average per-call price based on intra-and inter-day
usage patterns of households in our sample. Finally, some intraLATA calling plan prices
depend on the distance of calls made. We converted their price to a weighted average
per-call price based on the distribution of call distances for all households in our sample.
In the remainder of the paper, we will therefore ignore within-call non-linear pricing and
the household’s choice of timing of individual calls or distance of calls made.
Typically, at a particular wire center, the carriers oﬀer one metered plan and one
ﬂat-rate plan for local calling. Verizon’s prices for the metered plan diﬀer for metro and
non-metro regions12 while AT&T and MCI oﬀer a single metered tariﬀ to all New York
customers. Verizon’s prices for the ﬂat-rate plan diﬀered across ﬁve diﬀerent rate groups
12Verizon’s metro regions include the wire centers in the ﬁve New York city boroughs (Manhattan,
Brooklyn, Bronx, Staten Island and Queens), Westchester, Rockland and Putnam counties and Long
Island (Nassau and Suﬀolk counties). Wire centers in all other areas are non-metro.
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(groups of wire centers), which do not include New York City13 where the ﬂat-rate plan
is not available. AT&T and MCI diﬀerentiate pricing of the ﬂat-rate plan only between
metro and non-metro regions.14 There is one important exception to the carriers oﬀering
equivalently structured plans. Verizon did not oﬀer a ﬂat-rate or hybrid plan in New
York City during the sample period and MCI introduced a metro ﬂat-rate plan only in
September 2000, while AT&T oﬀered such a plan during the entire sample period. Table 1
summarizes AT&T, MCI, and Verizon’s pricing of local service over time and across areas.
From the beginning of 2002 onwards, Verizon’s local calling rates consistently increased.
AT&T’s rates for basic service are higher than Verizon’s except for the metered service
in the early part of the sample through March 2000. MCI, in contrast, charges a lower
ﬁxed fee for its metered service relative to Verizon for a signiﬁcant part of the sample
period. Per-call charges, however, are generally higher than Verizon’s prices. Thus, in
areas where equivalent plans on the three carriers are available, a household would pay
higher basic service rates on AT&T, and possibly on MCI, than on Verizon.
Table 2 summarizes the prices of the three providers’ intraLATA tariﬀs. For
intraLATA toll service, Verizon oﬀered two metered option, the Regional Calling Plan
and the Sensible Minutes plan. Rates on these plans, which diﬀer between the metro
and non-metro regions, dropped over time. AT&T and MCI oﬀered a single metered
intraLATA plan. In addition, AT&T oﬀered the expanded LATA plan, a unique option
among the providers which bundled local and intraLATA toll service into a single hybrid
tariﬀ. Across areas, Verizon’s per-call charges fall in between the lower rates oﬀered by
AT&T and the higher rates oﬀered by MCI.
Virtually every household purchases a ﬁxed line to their home. Penetration of
landline phones in New York as of March for each year in our sample is 95.1% (1999),
96.1% (2000), 95.0% (2001) and 96.0% (2002). Once it subscribes to a plan, a household
faces a separate decision of whether to consume any calls or not but all of the plans
oﬀered in our sample require a ﬁxed fee for at least local usage (if not for intraLATA toll
usage). We do observe households choosing not to consume any calls in a given month,
especially for intraLATA toll.
Of the 7,222 households in the sample, 5,233 subscribe to Verizon, 696 to AT&T,
362 to MCI, and 931 to Frontier Communications.15 Due to reporting errors by TNS or
other data issues, we are not able to use all available observations in our estimation. The
sample observations with complete demographic and usage information total 3,981 (76%)
for Verizon, 592 (85%) for AT&T, 218 (62%) for MCI, and 780 (84%) for Frontier.16
13Speciﬁcally, New York zones 1 through 7 wire centers, which encompass the Manhattan, Bronx and
Brooklyn boroughs.
14AT&T and MCI’s metro region includes all wire centers in LATA 132 (which includes New York
City and Westchester and Nassau counties).
15547 households were not with one of the top ﬁve carriers and were dropped from the sample.
16The major reasons for excluding observations from the bill data included an obvious data entry error,
the household subscribing to an obscure plan, billing for a partial month or unknown credits making
it impossible to match the bill to a plan, the household switching plans in the middle of a month,
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Table 3 compares the main demographic features, location, and provider choices
of the households in the TNS sample to the New York state aggregate. The entrants’
representation in the sample is similar to aggregate market shares for New York State.
In 2001, for example, the New York State PSC reports market shares based on number of
lines of 11.8% and 5.6% for AT&T and MCI respectively, while in the TNS sample for the
same year, 12.2% of households are AT&T customers and 5.4% are MCI customers. The
share of households who use an ILEC amounts to 79.0% in 2001 of which Verizon captures
80.8%. 48.1% of sample households live in the New York Metro region, similar to the
distribution of the total New York State population. We include average household size
and income as main proxies for usage and identify households who recently relocated and
had to choose a new service provider by indicators of whether they moved in the past one
or ﬁve years. The household’s average size in the TNS sample is not directly comparable
to the New York State average since TNS truncates all households with more than ﬁve
members. The income distribution is slightly skewed towards lower income households
relative to the state’s aggregate distribution.
Table 4 contains summary statistics for additional demographic variables used in
the analysis. Apart from the above mentioned demographic characteristics that inﬂuence
usage diﬀerences across households, we use information on other telecommunications
products used by the household, such as whether at least one member of the household
subscribes to wireless service or whether the household has access to the Internet at
home. Furthermore, table 4 summarizes the households’ long-distance provider choices
in relation to their local provider choice, as well as whether the household receives a
combined bill for local and long-distance service. Across incumbents and entrants, 38.7%
of households use the same provider for local and long-distance service. This fraction is
signiﬁcantly higher for CLEC households, however; 88.5% of AT&T customers and 85.3%
of MCI customers subscribe to these providers’ long-distance services. In the data, we
also observe whether households receive a single bill for local and long-distance service.
New York ILECs oﬀer households an option to request that their long-distance service
be billed through the ILEC on a single bill regardless of long-distance provider. Of the
households who use an incumbent’s local service, 76.4% of households elect this co-billing
option. Furthermore, the entrants AT&T and MCI combine billing for 97.0% and 94.4%,
respectively, of the sample households that use them as both their local and long-distance
service provider.
multiple phone lines in the household, and bundling of long-distance and local service in the same plan.
Bundling of local and long-distance service during the sample period is rare occuring only for 0.7% (52)
observations. Similarly, tariﬀs that bundle local service with other telecommunications services, such as
DSL or cellular, are generally not available during the sample period. Based on the bill-level data alone,
the usable observations include 601 AT&T, 218 MCI, 791 Frontier, and 5,021 Verizon households.
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4 Descriptive Results
A usual diﬃculty in assessing the eﬀect of entry is controlling for the incumbents’ response
to entry. In our setting we take advantage of the fact that any response by the incumbent
is regulated, as discussed in Section 2, and to ﬁrst-order can be ignored. Cost eﬀects on
the supply-side of the industry are also minimal. Since the entrants lease the incumbent’s
infrastructure, the industry’s overall cost structure remains unchanged. If the UNE rates
are set correctly at cost by regulators, the incumbent does not determine the cost of
entrants’ provision. Aside from increased marketing expenditures and service costs (such
as operators) by ﬁrms, entry has no eﬀect on ﬁrms’ costs of providing local service.
Therefore, our approach is to model only demand-side decisions and assume that supply-
side decisions are of second-order. Although we choose to ignore supply-side decisions,
this does not imply that the eﬀects on aggregate ﬁrm proﬁts are of second-order as we
discuss below.
The eﬀects of entry on consumer welfare in our context can be decomposed into
four components: 1) pure price eﬀects (holding quantity of usage and quality of service
constant), 2) eﬀects of diﬀerences in quality between the incumbent and entrants, 3)
changes in quantity of usage due to demand responses from price changes and 4) beneﬁts
from receiving a single bill for all telecommunications services. The ﬁrst category repre-
sents a transfer from ﬁrms to consumers or vice-versa. The second involves an increase
in consumer surplus (due to increased variety) but no change in aggregate ﬁrm proﬁts
(ignoring changes in marketing and service costs). Category 2 essentially quantiﬁes the
extent to which the ﬁrms’ services are diﬀerentiated. The third category represents a
decrease or increase in deadweight loss and the corresponding increase or decrease in
consumer welfare and ﬁrm proﬁts. The fourth category represents an increase in con-
sumer welfare with little eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts (assuming the costs of producing a single
bill are similar to that of producing separate bills). Finally, there are surplus transfers
from the incumbent to the entrants.
While bundling of local and long-distance service into one tariﬀ did not occur to
a large extent during our sample, our welfare analysis recognizes two signiﬁcant ways in
which bundling of the two services under the same provider – as opposed to the same
plan – are relevant. First, the entrants oﬀered discounts to households that chose them
for both services. This discount amounted to $1 for AT&T and $4.95 for MCI (from
August 1999 to August 2000 only) during the sample period. We account for this in
our estimation of the price eﬀects. Second, households may place value on receiving a
single bill for both services rather than two separate bills (category 4 beneﬁts above).
As discussed above, there are two instances in which we observe households receiving
a single bill for local and long-distance service. First, households who use the same
provider for local and long-distance service nearly always receive only one bill for the
two services. Second, households may bill their long-distance service through Verizon,
even if the service providers diﬀer and approximately 65.9% of households make use of
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this option.17 Our data thus allows us to identify the value of a single bill to households
separately from quality eﬀects that may induce households to choose the same provider.
Estimating pure price eﬀects (category 1) does not require a statistical model
since, in the absence of quantity and quality eﬀects, we simply calculate how much
households who switched to the entrants would have paid on the incumbent plan optimal
for that household. Estimating the quality, quantity and convenience eﬀects (categories
2-4) requires estimating an econometric demand model that allows us to evaluate, in a
counterfactual, what each category’s contribution to welfare would be relative to the case
where the entrants’ plans are not available. Nevertheless, households’ observed choice
behavior after entry relative to before provides some evidence of the role that non-price
eﬀects may play in the demand for local service. We begin by analyzing the pure price
eﬀects and by motivating the need for allowing for ﬁrm quality eﬀects in the econometric
model discussed in section 5. We then provide descriptive evidence of the eﬀects from
the other three categories.
4.1 Price Eﬀects
Ignoring quantity and quality eﬀects, assessing the eﬀects of entry on consumers is simply
an accounting exercise. That is, assuming that consumers did not change their usage
in response to price changes and ignoring any quality diﬀerences among ﬁrms, we can
compute the eﬀect of entry by simply comparing what households paid in the presence
of the entrants to what they would have paid under the hypothetical that the ﬁrms had
not entered. Since AT&T and MCI only entered in Verizon’s regions, we include it as
the only ILEC in our analysis.
In this counterfactual, we answer the question of how much New York State
consumers have saved by the presence of the entrants assuming that they did not adjust
their consumption and ignoring ﬁrm quality eﬀects. Our methodology is to evaluate the
amount of money that households that have switched to a CLEC would have paid to
Verizon if they had remained with Verizon. This requires mapping the household to a
speciﬁc Verizon plan based on its usage and evaluating the amount it would have paid to
Verizon under that plan. We then calculate household savings as the diﬀerence between
the amount it would have paid to Verizon and what it actually paid to the CLEC. Our
comparisons are contemporaneous. For example, for a household that chose AT&T in
January 2001, we compare the amount it paid to AT&T at that time with the amount
it would have paid if it had been forced to choose among Verizon plans available at that
same time.
17While a signiﬁcant fraction of households bills their long-distance service through the ILEC, we
obviously do not know whether all households are aware of this optional service, which may confound
the convenience eﬀect. The ILEC has, in principal, an incentive to promote the service, however, to gain
additional information about their customers’ usage patterns.
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We make three important assumptions in this counterfactual. First, we assume
that households have chosen the optimal CLEC plan and would choose the optimal
Verizon plan if they were on Verizon. We discuss the validity of this assumption below.
Second, we assume that if a household chose a ﬂat-rate plan on the CLEC it would also
have chosen a ﬂat-rate plan from Verizon. We must make this assumption because the
TNS data does not provide usage data for households on ﬂat-rate plans. Third, sometimes
there was no Verizon plan comparable to the one chosen by the CLEC customer, forcing us
to make assumptions about households’ usage in these cases. This occurs for households
in New York City where Verizon did not oﬀer a ﬂat-rate plan during our sample but AT&T
and MCI did. In this case, the household must choose Verizon’s metered plan under the
counterfactual and we base their charges on estimated usage. The other instance of this
is for households that chose AT&T’s expanded LATA plan, which bundles local and
intraLATA toll at a ﬂat rate, a combination not oﬀered by Verizon. In this case we
assume that the households would choose Verizon’s ﬂat-rate plan for local usage. Since
we do not know the households’ intraLATA toll usage, we base our evaluation of how
much they would pay on Verizon’s intraLATA toll metered plan on estimated intraLATA
toll usage.18 Of the three assumptions, only the ﬁrst one is necessary in our full model
discussed in Section 5.
Table 5 presents the results of the counterfactual with the savings divided into
categories based on their source. On average, households switching to AT&T saved $1.15
per month on their bill relative to subscribing to Verizon’s optimal contemporaneous
plan, ignoring quantity changes and quality diﬀerentials across ﬁrms.19 Of this, $0.89
on average was due to buying both long-distance and local service from AT&T. AT&T
oﬀered a $1 discount to households who subscribed to AT&T for both local and long-
distance services and 89% of the AT&T households in our sample did so. Another
$0.53 was due to savings on vertical features purchased from AT&T which would have
been more expensive on Verizon. Households on average lost money on combined basic
18Speciﬁcally, in the case of AT&T and MCI’s ﬂat-rate plans in New York City we ﬁrst compute
the breakeven number of calls between the CLEC’s ﬂat-rate and metered plan. We then calculate the
average usage of households in New York City prior to the entry of CLECs who consumed more than this
threshold and assume that these households consumed this average. In the case of AT&T’s expanded
LATA plan, we compute the breakeven number of calls between AT&T’s ﬂat-rate plan for local usage
(intraLATA toll not included) and its expanded LATA plan which bundled local and intraLATA toll
usage. We then calculate the average intraLATA toll usage of households prior to CLEC entry who
consumed more than this threshold and assume that these households consumed this average.
19AT&T and MCI engage in additional promotional activities to induce households to switch or stay
with the provider. The majority of such promotions is in the form of a discount applied to the household’s
bill for a certain number of billing periods if the household satisﬁes speciﬁc conditions of the promotion.
Based on a comparison of the conditions of AT&T’s promotions to the households’ bills, none of the
AT&T subscribers in the sample received such bill credits, even though a large share was, in principal,
eligible to beneﬁt from the promotion. To the extent that households beneﬁted from oﬀ-bill promotions
that were missing from the AT&T promotions data or received promotional discounts from MCI, any
consumer welfare gains in this paper represent a lower bound on total consumer welfare gains from
competition.
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charges for local and intraLATA toll service by switching to AT&T due to the higher
prices charged by AT&T calling plans (see Tables 1 and 2). These statistics then suggest
that households beneﬁted on average by switching to AT&T because of the discounts for
long distance and savings on vertical features, despite the higher basic service rates.
The results for MCI are similar although households saved less on average. The
mean household switching to MCI saved $0.40 per month on its bill relative to subscribing
to Verizon’s optimal contemporaneous plan, ignoring as above quantity changes and
quality diﬀerentials across ﬁrms. Households on average lost money on combined basic
and intraLATA toll charges as well as on vertical features purchased from MCI. However,
households that subscribed to both local and long distance service on MCI from August
1999 to August 2000 received a $4.95 discount leading to an average discount of $1.07
across all households. The mean sample household thus beneﬁted by switching to MCI
solely due to the long-distance discounts, but paid higher basic service rates and vertical
features prices.20
4.2 Quality Eﬀects
In this subsection we oﬀer evidence that diﬀerences in ﬁrm quality motivate households’
choice of carriers after entry by AT&T and MCI. The average household savings on AT&T
and MCI masks signiﬁcant heterogeneity across households. Out of 592 households in our
sample that chose AT&T, 331 households (56%) saved money by switching to AT&T.
The average monthly savings for these households was $5.39 and the median savings
were $4.44. Most of the households that saved money (280 or 83%) were in metropolitan
regions. Of these 280 households, the vast majority were on one of AT&T’s ﬂat-rate plans
– 173 were on AT&T’s local ﬂat-rate plan and 86 were on AT&T’s expanded LATA ﬂat-
rate plan which bundled local and intraLATA toll service. 86 of the households live in
New York City where Verizon did not oﬀer ﬂat-rate service. The balance were on AT&T’s
lifeline plan (10) or its metered plan (11).
For the 261 households that lost money by switching to AT&T, the average
monthly loss was $4.24 or 22% of the price they would have paid on Verizon. These
households were fairly evenly split between the metropolitan (155) and non-metropolitan
regions (106) with only 9 households in New York City where Verizon did not oﬀer a
ﬂat-rate plan. Most of these households were on AT&T’s local ﬂat-rate plan (212) but,
unlike those saving money, very few were on AT&T’s expanded LATA plan (10). The
balance were on AT&T’s metered plan (30) or Lifeline plan (11). For lack of a better
word, we call switches that are not justiﬁed by price diﬀerences “mistakes.” Below, we
oﬀer evidence that these may not be mistakes in the literal sense of the word, but that
20Note that MCI did oﬀer bundles of local and long distance during the time period of our study and
we do not take such bundles into consideration so that beneﬁts to consumers are underestimated as a
result. As noted earlier, such bundles are rare in our sample.
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such provider choices are justiﬁed by perceived quality diﬀerences between AT&T and
Verizon.
Out of the 218 households in our sample that chose MCI, 139 (64%) saved money
by switching to MCI. The average monthly savings for these households was $3.24 and
the median savings were $2.25. Of the households that saved money, 63% (87 out of 139)
lived in the metropolitan region. For the 79 households that lost money by switching to
MCI, the average monthly loss was $4.59 or 19% of the price they would have paid on
Verizon. Similar to the households that saved monye, 66% of these households lived in
the metropolitan region (52 out of 79). The propensity to make mistakes diﬀered by plan
type, however. Of households on a metered plan, 29% made an apparently erroneous
choice compared to 34% of households on a hybrid plan and 54% of household on a ﬂat
rate plan, with 36% of households choosing a suboptimal plan overall.
To determine the sources of these “mistakes,” we compare the frequency and
magnitude of “mistakes” made by households in choosing between ﬁrms to the frequency
and magnitude of “mistakes” made in choosing plans within each ﬁrm. If “mistakes” are
signiﬁcantly more frequent across ﬁrms than within ﬁrms this is evidence that consumers’
“mistakes” in choosing their provider are likely due to perceived diﬀerences in ﬁrm quality
with associated diﬀerences in households’ willingness to pay for such quality. If, on the
other hand, the within-ﬁrm “mistakes” overwhelm the across-ﬁrm “mistakes” this would
be evidence that consumers face signiﬁcant uncertainty about their usage after they have
committed to a plan.
To assess the frequency and magnitude of “mistakes” made by households who
remained with Verizon for their local service, we evaluate the amount of money that
such households would have paid to AT&T or MCI if they had switched to one of these
ﬁrms at that time, conditional on AT&T oﬀering service in their location. In our sample,
3981 Verizon household observations had the option to switch to MCI or AT&T based on
their location. On average, these households saved $1.68 per month on their bill relative
to subscribing to the optimal contemporaneous AT&T plan, ignoring quantity changes
and quality diﬀerentials across ﬁrms. This is 3.8% of what they would have paid on
the optimal AT&T or MCI plan. As with the AT&T households, this average masks
signiﬁcant heterogeneity across households. Out of the 3981 households, 1583 (40%) lost
money by not switching to AT&T. The average monthly loss for these 1583 households
was $3.85 per month or 14% of the price they would have paid on the optimal AT&T
plan.
To assess within-ﬁrm “mistakes” we evaluate whether households that chose a
metered plan from their provider would have been better oﬀ if they had chosen that
provider’s ﬂat-rate plan, where available, given their usage for the month. To quantify
the magnitude of the “mistake” we normalize the lost savings by the total cost of the
ﬂat-rate plan.
Table 6 summarizes the results of this analysis along with that from the across-ﬁrm
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analysis. As the table shows, although the average savings foregone as a percentage of to-
tal charges within ﬁrms is similar to that across ﬁrms, the frequency of “mistakes” across
ﬁrms overwhelms the frequency of “mistakes” within ﬁrms (the t-statistics for diﬀerence
in means are 5.85, 4.66 and 19.35 for AT&T, MCI and Verizon respectively in comparing
across and within-ﬁrm mean “mistakes.”). This is evidence that consumers’ perceptions
of ﬁrm quality are more important than demand uncertainty or consumer irrationality
in households’ choices. Mistakes then mostly represent diﬀerences in willingness to pay
for quality across households.
This is even more apparent for households that switched to AT&T’s higher-priced
ﬂat-rate plan, which had precisely the same features as Verizon’s ﬂat-rate plan. Choosing
a higher-priced ﬂat-rate plan must be due to ﬁrm quality diﬀerences since it is higher
priced regardless of usage. For metered plans, on the other hand, the decision may be
aﬀected by uncertainty in demand. Over 87% (221) of households making “mistakes”
were on ﬂat-rate plans and lived in areas where Verizon oﬀered a (more expensive) ﬂat-
rate plan.21 This is consistent with results in Miravete (2002b), who uses panel data
to assess households’ “mistakes.” Miravete ﬁnds that households, on average, make
the right tariﬀ choices based on their actual consumption. In addition, he ﬁnds that
households who make “mistakes” rapidly switch to the correct plan and that households
switch in response to small possible reductions in their billed costs. Table 6 also provides
evidence that consumer “inertia” in decision-making is not likely driving the “mistakes.”
Households who switch to AT&T, for example, are more likely to have made a “mistake”
than households who took no action and remained with Verizon, even though the fact
that they actively searched for a new provider suggests that they are likely to be more
price-sensitive and less prone to inertia than the remaining households. The frequency
of “mistakes” for MCI households is very similar to that for Verizon.
Apart from willingness to pay for a higher quality service, there are several other
potential explanations for why households might appear to choose the wrong service
provider. Such explanations are generally related to the fact that there is a time lag
between the household’s plan choice, which occurs at the beginning of the billing period
or earlier and their usage decision over the course of the billing period. For example, if due
to inertia or transaction costs, households base their plan choice on expected usage over
a longer period (as opposed to month-by-month), a “mistake” or suboptimal plan choice
in a given month may still be consistent with a correct overall choice, especially if there
are anticipated usage ﬂuctuations over the course of the period. A second explanation for
such “mistaken” choices would be that some types of households are worse at predicting
their usage at the beginning of the billing period than others. Firms, realizing this, may
then target such households by oﬀering appropriate plans. For example, a ﬁrm may oﬀer
21A similar comparison can be made for MCI although it oﬀered hybrid plans in addition to ﬂat-rate
plans. Over 20% (16) of the households making “mistakes” in switching to MCI were on ﬂat-rate plans
and lived in areas where Verizon oﬀered a more expensive ﬂat-rate plan. Another 57% (45) were on
hybrid plans.
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a ﬂat-rate plan to households that systematically overestimate their usage.22
To investigate the importance of such explanations in the context of local phone
service, we estimate a set of probit models to analyze the extent to which households
that make “mistakes” in switching to AT&T or MCI, or not switching to AT&T or MCI,
diﬀer systematically in their characteristics from those households who do not make these
mistakes. In addition to demographic characteristics, we also control for prior experience
that the household may have with AT&T or MCI as a carrier by including indicator vari-
ables for whether the household uses AT&T or MCI for its long-distance service.23 Table
7 displays the results from this estimation. A few variables are economically signiﬁcant
in predicting a “mistake” in switching to AT&T. Younger heads of household are 26%
less likely, those who moved within the last year are 29% less likely and households that
have a Black or Hispanic head of household are 25% and 23%, respectively, less likely to
make a “mistake.” Households with AT&T for both local and long distance service are
26% less likely to pay more on AT&T than on Verizon. However, note that the variance
explained by this probit is very low (likelihood ratio index of 0.0947).24 In the case of
MCI, each additional household member makes a household approximately 12% more
likely to make a mistake and households with MCI as their long distance provider are
33% more likely, while those that receive a single bill for local and long-distance service,
but use diﬀerent providers, are 54% more likely to erroneously switch. As with the AT&T
probit, the variance explained by the probit is very low (likelihood ratio index of 0.19). In
the case of MCI, the results are consistent with diﬀerences in perceived ﬁrm quality being
important. The probit results predicting “mistakes” in not switching to AT&T or MCI
are similar in that a number of variables are economically and statistically signiﬁcant,
but as in the CLEC regressions, very little variance in customer behavior is explained
by observable demographic characteristics (likelihood ratio index of 0.1325). To test the
importance of learning, in an alternative unreported model, we included time since the
CLEC’s entry and time since a price change, both measured in days, as explanatory
variables. The results indicate that for every 100 days since AT&T’s entry, a household’s
likelihood of erroneously choosing AT&T decreases by 1.99%, providing statistically sig-
niﬁcant evidence of some extent of household learning. However, as before, the overall
explanatory power of the model does not improve signiﬁcantly, resulting in a likelihood
ratio index of 0.1078. For MCI, in contrast, the probability of mistakes increases by 3.8%
22Another possibility is that households who chose to switch to a CLEC were households that were
more likely to be on a suboptimal Verizon plan before they switched. While this could be true to some
extent, over 87% of households making “mistakes” in switching to AT&T chose AT&T’s ﬂat-rate plan.
If these households had previously chosen Verizon’s ﬂat-rate plan (the counterfactual comparison we
made) in error, they must also have chosen the AT&T ﬂat-rate plan in error since it is more expensive
than the Verizon ﬂat-rate plan.
23We thus assume that households made their long-distance provider choice of AT&T or MCI prior
to choosing the carriers as their local service providers since the two carriers extended into local service
provision from the long-distance market.
24We use McFadden’s (1974) likelihood ratio index, deﬁned as LRI = 1 − ln[L1]ln[L0] , where L0 is the
log-likelihood computed with only a constant term and L1 is the log-likelihood of the full model.
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for every 100 days since MCI’s entry, with a likelyhood ratio index of 0.2117. Across
providers, thus, we do not ﬁnd consistent, practical signiﬁcance of learning.
The probits in Table 7 also include monthly dummies and a dummy for September
and October 2001. If the share of the variance explained by these dummy variables were
large, it would be a sign that households choose calling plans based on expected usage
over the course of the year as opposed to responding to seasonality in calling patterns
by adjusting the optimal plan on a month-by-month basis (as we assume in our model
in Section 5). The monthly dummies only account for an increase in the likelihood ratio
index from 0.0614 to 0.0947 in the AT&T customers’ probit, from 0.1243 to 0.1815 in
the MCI customers’ probit and from 0.1265 to 0.1854 in the Verizon customers’ probit.
It appears that anticipated seasonal demand ﬂuctuation are, therefore, not very impor-
tant in driving incorrect provider choices, supporting the assumption of month-by-month
optimization by households.
The other eﬀect that entry could have on ﬁrm quality is to induce ﬁrms to compete
in the variety of vertical features they oﬀer. During the time period of our sample,
Verizon did not introduce any new vertical features.25 Since vertical features are part of
the infrastructure that AT&T and MCI lease from Verizon, this also implies that AT&T
and MCI did not introduce any vertical features that Verizon did not oﬀer. Entry could
also have spurred changes in the variety of vertical features bundles oﬀered. However, this
does not appear to be the case in our sample. AT&T oﬀered a single bundle of vertical
features, the “Three Feature Package,” which included Caller ID and the household’s
choice of two additional features from a list of features during the entire period of our
sample. MCI did not oﬀer any bundles of vertical features during our sample period.
Verizon, on the other hand, oﬀered four diﬀerent bundling options: “Custom Calling
Package” (which oﬀered at least twelve diﬀerent combinations of two or three features),
“Value Pack” (which oﬀered an unlimited number of features for a ﬁxed price), “Call
Manager Package” (which oﬀered at least two diﬀerent combinations of four features) and
“Feature Combinations” (which oﬀered at least seven diﬀerent combinations of two to
four features), oﬀerings which also did not change during the sample period. Thus, entry
did not expand either the range of vertical features oﬀered or the households’ choice of
vertical features bundles. Furthermore, since AT&T and MCI do not observe households’
vertical feature choices prior to entry and Verizon is only able to use information on
vertical features usage if households provide their consent, the ability of carriers to target
intense users of high-margin vertical features is limited.
Since the evidence points toward diﬀerences in ﬁrm quality as accounting for
across-ﬁrm “mistakes” we allow for observed (and unobserved) ﬁrm quality eﬀects in our
econometric model and ignore inertia and demand uncertainty as being of second-order
importance only.26
25This refers to features that were subscribed to by at least ﬁve households in our sample. We did not
investigate features subscribed to less frequently.
26One way to accommodate uncertainty in consumer usage in our model would be to base household
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4.3 Quantity Eﬀects
To obtain an estimate of the eﬀect of entry on consumers’ demand responses to price
changes, we exploit the fact that AT&T’s entry occurred in two major stages. We
compare consumption by Verizon households before and after the second wave of AT&T
entry (in August 2001) in areas that AT&T did not enter in its ﬁrst wave of entry (in
1999).27 This provides a before- and after-entry comparison of usage. We use changes
in consumption between the same time periods (before versus after August 2001) in
Rochester and Citizens’ territories as a benchmark, since no major CLECs entered their
territories during this time. While household behavior in their territories allows us to
control for time trends in usage patterns, it does not allow us to control for quantity
eﬀects of changes in Verizon’s prices over the sample period. To adequately control for
relative price changes, we would need to observe households who were exposed to identical
price changes, but did not have the option of choosing AT&T as a provider after August
2001. Since AT&T had entered the entire Verizon territory with its expansion in August
2001, such an experiment is not available to us. Similarly, since we observe usage on
ﬂat-rate plans only for a limited set of households, the quantity changes observed in the
data are based on metered plan activity only.
Overall, consumption of local usage on metered plans decreased by more after
entry relative to the change in consumption in Rochester’s and Citizens’ territories. On
average, Verizon households consumed 8.4 fewer local calls after entry than before, while
Citizens households consumed 3.0 additional calls and Rochester households 7.8 addi-
tional calls. These increases are statistically diﬀerent from those for Verizon households
at the 11.1% level for Citizens and the 7.1% level for Rochester in a one-tailed t-test. The
consumption of intraLATA toll usage, on the other hand, increased more in Verizon’s ter-
ritory post-entry than it did in Rochester’s and Citizens’ territories. Verizon households
consumed 3.6 more calls on average after entry, while intraLATA consumption fell by 0.1
calls for Citizens households and increased by only 1.1 calls on Rochester households, on
average. These changes diﬀer from Verizon households at the 0.01% level and 2.8% level,
respectively, in a one-tailed t-test.
To the extent that changes in Citizens’ and Rochester’s territories represent what
would have occurred in the absence of entry, local consumption by Verizon households
decreased, while intraLATA usage increased with entry. There are two possible expla-
nations for these patterns. First, the PSC approved a signiﬁcant increase in Verizon’s
prices for basic service in March 2002, after a prior price reduction in October in 2000.
At the same time, intraLATA toll prices fell eﬀective June 2001 with the introduction of
Verizon’s Sensible Minutes plan. The direction of the quantity changes observed in the
data is consistent with them representing demand responses to these price changes. At
choices on expected utitlity.
27MCI had entered Verizon’s entire territory before the beginning of our sample period, precluding a
similar analysis in its territories.
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the same time, the quantity changes do not control for higher-usage households being
more likely to switch to CLECs in areas where Verizon does not oﬀer a ﬂat-rate plan.
Verizon’s overall mix of ﬂat-rate and message-rate plans did not change signiﬁcantly over
the sample period. If it were to lose a similar proportion of high-usage customers to
CLECs among both its ﬂat-rate and its metered-rate customers, however, the average
quantity consumed on metered plans would fall regardless. Our full model will estimate
these quantity eﬀects much more precisely.
4.4 Convenience Eﬀects
As a result of the 1996 Act, the markets for diﬀerent types of telecommunication services
became better integrated by (eventually) allowing long-distance providers and ILECs
to compete in each others’ markets. Woroch (2002) predicts that as a result of such
increased integration, new service oﬀerings are likely to arise in the form of innovative
bundles of services. While local competitors for the most part began to compete in
bundled products (such as tariﬀs that combine local and long-distance service) only after
our sample period, the ability to consolidate communication services under one provider
may generate “one-stop-shopping” beneﬁts to consumers. The magnitude of such beneﬁts
in the telecommunications setting has to date only been studied by Kridel and Taylor
(1993) who estimate consumer response to the bundling of two custom-calling features.
The consolidation of services under one provider leads, most immediately, to a
simpliﬁcation of the household’s ﬁnancial planning to the extent that the household
receives a single bill for both local and long-distance service. Consequently, we term such
beneﬁts to consolidation a “convenience eﬀect” and assess the extent to which receiving
a single bill for local and long-distance services drives the switching decision.
To determine which characteristics correlate with a household’s switch to AT&T
or MCI we estimate a multinomial model with three provider choices. The results are
in Table 8. Relative to the small variance in households’ incorrect provider choices ex-
plained by demographics above, household characteristics explain a signiﬁcant fraction
of the variance in choice behavior (likelihood ratio index of 0.4055). Several characteris-
tics are statistically, if not necessarily practically, signiﬁcant in explaining the switching
decision for the AT&T choice. Households that live in New York city are 4.8% less likely
to switch to AT&T. Racial diﬀerences across households contribute in explaining carrier
choice. Households with a Black head of household are 4.8% more likely to switch, His-
panic heads of household are 4.0% less likely to switch, and other minority households
are 2.7% less likely to choose AT&T. Furthermore, each additional one thousand dollars
of monthly income makes it 0.8% less likely to switch and each additional member of the
household makes it 2.0% more likely to switch if they are outside New York city. Prior
work (Kling and Van Der Ploeg, 1990; and Miravete, 2002a) has found that lower income
levels and larger household sizes correlate with a higher demand for local telecommu-
nications service. Our results are thus consistent with higher-usage households being
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marginally more likely to choose AT&T’s local service over Verizon. Most signiﬁcant,
both statistically and economically, for the choice of AT&T is whether the household
(35.3% more likely) has prior experience with AT&T in the form of long-distance service
and whether the household receives a common bill for its local and long-distance service,
but uses two diﬀerent providers.
The results for MCI are similar. Only two demographic variables are signiﬁcant:
one thousand additional dollars of monthly income makes a household 0.1% less likely to
switch and each additional household member makes the household 0.3% more likely to
switch. Again, the MCI long distance dummy and the interaction term for receiving a
single bill while utilizing a diﬀerent long distance provider are the most signiﬁcant, both
statistically and in magnitude. Households with MCI as their long distance provider
are 42.2% more likely to switch, while households that already receive the beneﬁt of a
single bill, even though they have a diﬀerent long-distance provider, are 1.7% less likely
to switch.
These results are consistent with households that already use either of the entrants
as their long-distance provider attributing a higher perceived quality to that ﬁrm than
other households. Alternatively, the results could be an indication that the entrants
market their local service more aggressively to households that subscribe to their long-
distance service, assuming that these households had already chosen their long-distance
provider prior to making the local provider choice. In addition, households who receive a
single bill but have diﬀerent local and long distance providers are less likely to use either
AT&T or MCI for their local service, these being households that can already receive
the value from a single bill without switching their local service to one of the entrants.
Thus, whether a household receives a common bill and its preference for long-distance
provider are the most important drivers of consumers’ perceived quality of local service.
5 Econometric Model
5.1 Household Choice Problem
We consider households indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., Im in m = 1, 2, ...,M markets. The
households choose a plan from the set of available plans, indexed by j = 1, 2, ..., Jm,
oﬀered by ﬁrms f = 1, 2, ..., Fm and the quantity of local calls q
L
ij and intraLATA toll
calls qTij they consume on the plan. To consume on plan j, consumers must pay a ﬁxed fee,
Pjm, a per-call local price of p
L
jm and a per-call intraLATA toll price of p
T
jm. Consumers
spend the remainder of their income on an outside good z at price pz.
Households have a choice of up to three types of tariﬀs, “metered,” “ﬂat-rate,”
and “hybrid” tariﬀs. On a metered tariﬀ, households pay pj > 0 per call regardless of
total usage and pay a ﬁxed fee of Pj ≥ 0. On a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ, consumers pay nothing
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for usage (pj = 0) but incur a ﬁxed fee of Pj > 0. On hybrid tariﬀs, households pay a
ﬁxed fee Pj > 0 and pay nothing for usage below a threshold q˜j but pay pj > 0 for usage
above q˜j . Households that live in areas where AT&T, MCI, and Verizon operate have a
choice of up to eight separate plans. Each of the three providers oﬀered both a metered
and a ﬂat-rate local plan28, which included intraLATA toll service priced on a per-call
basis. MCI’s oﬀerings included furthermore a hybrid plan while AT&T also oﬀered a
ﬂat-rate tariﬀ that combined local and intraLATA toll service under one tariﬀ. This
“Expanded LATA” plan is the only true bundle of local and intraLATA service into one
tariﬀ available during the sample period. The providers’ portfolios of tariﬀs remained
unchanged over the sample period, with the exception of the phasing-out of MCI’s hybrid
plan in September 2000. On average, households had a choice of six separate tariﬀs,
ranging from a minimum of three tariﬀs in areas where AT&T entered in 2001 only to
eight tariﬀs. Households that lived in Citizen or Rochester’s territory had a choice of
two plans only, namely metered or ﬂat-rate local service, both of which included linearly
priced intraLATA toll access. Due to the ﬁxed fee and the fact that local and intraLATA
toll services are bundled within a ﬁrm, it is optimal for the household to consume on a
single plan j.29
We assume that household i chooses that plan j that maximizes its utility subject
to the budget constraint given by:
u(qLij , q
T
ij, zi) = zi +
1
bLi
(
aLi q
L
ij −
(qLij)
2
2
)
+
1
bTi
(
aTi q
T
ij −
(qTij)
2
2
)
(1)
−
(
aLi
)2
2bLi
−
(
aTi
)2
2bTi
+ ζij
aLi , a
T
i , b
L
i , b
T
i > 0; q
L
ij ≤ aLi , qTij ≤ aTi .
s.t.
yi ≥ pLjmqLij + pTjmqTij + Pjm + zi.
In equation 1, the ﬁrst term represents the utility obtained from the outside
good whose price is normalized to one. The second and third terms measure the utility
obtained from local usage and intraLATA toll usage, respectively. The last term, ζij, is
household i’s perceived quality of plan j. Figure 3 demonstrates the indiﬀerence curves
for an interior solution on a metered tariﬀ, while Figure 4 displays an interior solution
28Verizon did not oﬀer a ﬂat-rate plan in New York City during the period of our sample, and MCI
introduced a ﬂat-rate plan in its Metro region only in September 2000.
29While it is theoretically possible that a household would consume on two plans (e.g. if one ﬁrm
oﬀers a low local service rate but a high intraLATA toll rate and the relative prices of the services on
the other ﬁrm are reversed) we do not observe this in our data.
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on a ﬂat-rate tariﬀ. The household whose choice is depicted in Figure 4 has a higher
satiation level, a, as well as a higher value for b, thus a more elastic demand.
Conditional on the choice of plan j, the associated conditional demand function
for usage of type S, S = {L, T}, is simply given by:
qSij(p
S
jm) =
⎧⎨
⎩
aSi − bSi pSjm if pSjm < a
S
i
bSi
0 otherwise.
(2)
Note that if a household chose a ﬂat-rate plan, with a marginal price for usage of pjm = 0,
or a hybrid plan where it remains within the included number of calls, q˜j , the demand
function simpliﬁes to:
qSij(p
S
jm = 0) = a
S
i . (3)
Substituting these conditional demand functions into the household’s utility func-
tion yields a set of conditional indirect utility functions that vary depending on the
household’s choice of plan type and usage patterns. For household i with positive usage
of local and intraLATA toll service, the conditional indirect utility function is given by:
vij(p
L
jm, p
T
jm, Pjm, yi) = yi − Pjm −
(
aLi −
1
2
bLi p
L
jm
)
pLjm (4)
−
(
aTi −
1
2
bTi p
T
jm
)
pTjm + ζij.
The third and fourth terms in the indirect utility function cancel if the household chooses
a ﬂat-rate plan. Corner solutions arise in the data for intraLATA toll calls. With zero
intraLATA toll calls, the indirect utility function is given by:
vij(p
L
jm, p
T
jm, Pjm, yi) = yi − Pjm −
(
aLi −
1
2
bLi p
L
jm
)
pLjm + ζij. (5)
Consumer preferences, aS and bS, vary as a function of the household’s observable
and unobservable characteristics. For the demand functions to be well-deﬁned, we restrict
aSi and b
S
i to be positive by specifying them as exponential functions of the household’s
observable characteristics:[
ln(aSi )
ln(bSi )
]
=
[
αSi
βSi
]
+
[
αSD
′
βSD
′
]
Di, S = {L, T}, (6)
where αSi , α
S
D, β
S
i , and β
S
D are (vectors of) parameters and Di is a vector of characteristics
for household i. Observable household characteristics Di include demographic variables
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such as the household’s size, income, and age composition and other communications
services used by the household such as Internet. We also include indicator variables for the
month of the household’s bill and a time trend, allowing demand to shift over the course
of the year or over time. Income serves solely as a shifter of the household’s valuation
of phone calls, but the estimated parameter does not have a structural interpretation as
an income eﬀect. We also include as characteristics the size in terms of population of
the household’s local and intraLATA calling areas. The calling areas are the same for all
plans oﬀered to a household and does not vary for households in the same location.
We assume that household i’s demand intercept contains an unobservable house-
hold taste for local or intraLATA usage in the form of αSi = α
S + νSi . The 2 × 1 vector
νi captures unobserved household characteristics that aﬀect demand for local and in-
traLATA toll calls, such as the size of the household’s network of contacts in the area. We
assume that the unobserved characteristics are independently and identically distributed
according to a bivariate Normal distribution with mean zero and variance-covariance
matrix Σν .
We further allow the slope coeﬃcient b to vary by household through the random
coeﬃcient βSi . We specify β
S
i =β
S + ηSi , with ηi a 2 × 1 vector of normally distributed
unobserved household characteristics that aﬀect the household’s price sensitivity. Note
that the assumptions on aSi and b
S
i imply that the demand error, ν
S
i , equals:
νSi = ln(a
S
i )− αS − αSD ′ Di (7)
= ln(qSij + exp(β
S
i + β
S
D
′
Di)pjm)− αS − αSD ′ Di
Last, we decompose household i’s perceived quality of plan j into observable plan
characteristics and an unobservable ﬁrm-level characteristic by parameterizing ζij as:
ζij = λf
′ Zi + ξfm + ij, (8)
with λf denoting a z × 1 vector of parameters. Zi includes household attributes such as
the household’s choice of one of the CLEC’s long-distance services as a measure of prior
experience with the CLEC, whether the household has recently moved, or whether the
household receives a single bill for its local and long-distance service. The included Zi
variables control for horizontal preference diﬀerences for a provider among households,
for example based on the household’s experience with the provider for a diﬀerent type of
service. Such characteristics do not necessarily drive its demand for usage. ξfm represents
an unobserved contribution to ﬁrm quality, such as the quality of its customer service.
The unobservable varies at the level of the ﬁrm, but not the level of the plan, and is the
same for all households, representing a vertical attribute of the provider. i is a J × 1
vector of shocks to household preferences for plan j = 1, ..., J , which we assume to be
distributed according to a Type 1 extreme-value distribution.
Note that the unobservable components in aSi aﬀect quantity consumed, but the
discrete choice only indirectly through the quantity choice. They vary only by household,
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but not by plan, through νSi . The unobservable components in ζij, on the other hand,
aﬀect only the discrete choice and not the quantity choice and depend on the ﬁrm and
plan. This error structure assumes that there is no unobservable characteristic of the
ﬁrm/plan that aﬀects the quantity choice since plans within the same ﬁrm oﬀer access to
the same quality of calls and customer service. Unobservable characteristics of the ﬁrm,
however, aﬀect the discrete plan choice via ξfm.
Similar to the discrete choice demand literature (Berry 1994, Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes 1995 and 2004, Goolsbee and Petrin 2003, and Nevo 2001), the ﬁrm-level
unobservable, ξfm, captures unobserved quality diﬀerences between ﬁrms. The literature
allows for correlations between ξ and prices that arise if higher-quality providers charge
higher prices and both ﬁrms and consumers observe these quality diﬀerences, but the
econometrician does not. The descriptive results presented above suggest that unobserved
provider characteristics are important in driving household provider choices, which might
similarly be reﬂected in the prices charged by each provider.30
In standard applications, the unobservable characteristic varies at the level of
product, capturing for example the unobserved quality or reliability of a particular auto-
mobile model. In our case, the product corresponds to a calling plan. Since calling plans,
however, are simply non-linear pricing schemes that give the customer access to the same
customer and billing services and quality of calls, we model the unobservable as varying
at the level of the ﬁrm only, instead of the level of the product. This allows us to control
for price endogeneity simply by including provider/market ﬁxed eﬀects in the household’s
indirect utility function. Since the unobserved provider characteristics and prices vary
at diﬀerent levels of aggregation, we are able to identify the unobserved characteristics
from observing a large number of provider choices in each of the markets.31,32
We assume that customer service and other unobserved quality measures are con-
stant within the metro and non-metro areas and estimate provider-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects,
normalizing Verizon’s ﬁxed eﬀect to zero.33 We allow for the ﬁxed eﬀects to diﬀer by
market structure and region. Speciﬁcally, we estimate separate ﬁxed eﬀects for the pe-
30Price endogeneity is potentially not as severe here as in the previously studied applications. The
incumbents’ prices continue to be actively regulated. Similarly, while not subject to regulatory approval,
the PSC requires entrants to ﬁle all tariﬀ changes, thus exerting some lesser degree of regulatory control.
The regulatory environment suggests instruments to control for possible price endogeneity, including the
lease rates that AT&T and MCI pay to Verizon to access its network as cost shifters, as well as the
prices charged by the three providers in other states, as suggested by Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2001).
31This procedure abstracts from any remaining unobservable quality diﬀerences across plans oﬀered
by the same provider. If, for example, AT&T pitched a particular plan to its customers, based on a
household characteristic unobserved by the econometrician, and charged a higher price for that plan
because it does so, the estimated price coeﬃcient would still be biased.
32The fact that unobservable characteristics vary at the level of the provider, not at the level of the
calling plan, would also complicate the direct application of the estimation techniques suggested in the
previous literature.
33We similarly normalize the parameters on the household characteristics that inﬂuence the discrete
choice, Zi, by setting λf to zero for Verizon.
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riod prior to AT&T’s entry in November 1999, for the period of its limited roll-out of
service until August 2001, and for the remaining sample period after its full entry into
the Verizon territory.
Our modeling framework corresponds to that in Hanemann (1984) for the case
of mutual exclusivity whereby each consumer chooses to consume a continuous quantity
from a single provider. The utility function accommodates the main features of the
institutional setting. First, the speciﬁcation allows for bundling of local and intraLATA
toll usage, but the consumption of local calls does not aﬀect the marginal utility obtained
from intraLATA toll calls and vice-versa. This implies that the demands for local and
intraLATA calls are independent of each other. Second, marginal utility of phone usage
(either local or intraLATA toll) declines with usage. This allows for satiation of demand
on ﬂat-rate plans with a zero marginal price since, at some point, the household spends
so much time on the phone that it crowds out time spent on outside activities. The
level of consumption at satiation depends on the household’s valuation index. Third, the
utility function allows for the possibility of zero consumption (corner solution) for both
goods. Note also that the utility function does not entail income eﬀects for either type
of call since income will drop out of the choice probabilities. The average monthly bill
amounts to only 0.74% of the lowest income category. Income eﬀects are consequently
likely to be small and furthermore diﬃcult to estimate precisely given the small variation
in monthly phone expenditures relative to monthly income.
Since vertical features represent a signiﬁcant portion of savings from price eﬀects,
it is important that we accommodate them in the econometric model. There are too many
possible combinations of vertical features oﬀered to explicitly estimate their choice by
households. Instead, we include their eﬀect as “virtual income” in the budget constraint,
as part of the ﬁxed fee Pjm. We assume that each household consumes an identical
bundle of vertical features regardless of which carrier or plan it chooses and adjust its
budget constraint by the diﬀerence in prices for that bundle between the two ﬁrms.
While the actual choice of vertical feature combinations by households is obviously more
complicated, it is a relatively good approximation. Vertical features are part of the
infrastructure that CLECs lease from the ILEC. Therefore, the vertical features oﬀered
by the ILEC are identical to those oﬀered by the CLEC and the only diﬀerence between
the two would be due to perceived ﬁrm quality diﬀerences, which we already allow for in
the model. The key simplifying assumption then is that the choice of vertical features is
the same regardless of price.
5.2 Estimation Procedure
The predictions from the model consist of an optimal plan choice and a corresponding
usage choice for both local and intraLATA toll, as a function of the household’s observable
and unobservable characteristics and the plan’s observable and unobservable attributes.
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We derive household i’s optimal plan choice by assuming that it chooses the plan
that maximizes its indirect utility, conditional on household- and ﬁrm-level unobserv-
ables. We assume independence between the choice and usage shocks. In our speciﬁc
application, the choice shock takes the role of unobserved preferences for a speciﬁc tariﬀ
due to, for example, exposure to plan-speciﬁc advertising. Correlation between the choice
and usage shocks could arise if the provider ran user- and plan-speciﬁc advertising cam-
paigns and decided to promote certain plans speciﬁcally to those households that exhibit
large variation in demand. We do not believe such correlations to be very signiﬁcant in
our application. Consequently, the conditional distribution of the choice shock given the
usage shock remains an extreme value distribution, and the probability that individual i
chooses plan j is simply:
πij =
exp[v¯ij(pj , Pj, Xj, Di, Zi, ηi, νi, ξf ; Θ)]∑J
k=1 exp[v¯ik(pk, Pk, Xk, Di, Zi, ηi, νi, ξf ; Θ)]
, (9)
where v¯ij(pj, Pj, Xj , Di, Zi, ηi, νi, ξf ; Θ) denotes all components of the indirect util-
ity function excluding ij . The model’s parameters are collapsed into the vector Θ. In
this random-coeﬃcient logit model, the probabilities are non-linear functions of νi and ηi.
We integrate over the unobservables using simulation techniques. Denoting a simulation
draw from the distribution of unobservables by n, the sample analog of the household’s
expected plan choice probability is given by:
E[πij ] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
πij(pj, Pj, Xj , Di, Zi, η
n
i , νˆi, ξf ; Θ). (10)
Similarly, the model predicts expected usage shocks for local and intraLATA toll
service of:
E[νˆSi ] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
{
ln(aSi (η
n
i ))− αS − αSD ′ Di
}
, S = {L, T}. (11)
For each of the I households we observe its plan choice denoted by indicator
variable Iij , where Iij = 1 if plan j is chosen and 0 otherwise, and its usage of local
calls, qLij , and of intraLATA toll calls, q
T
ij , on the chosen plan. We observe the quantity
choice for households on metered plans and for households on hybrid plans who consume
above the threshold, but do not observe it for those on ﬂat-rate plans or for those on
hybrid plans who consume below the threshold. Letting HL and HT denote the number
of households who chose a local or intraLATA ﬂat-rate or hybrid plan with usage below
the threshold, we thus observe I − HL and I − HT household quantity choices. The
chosen usage patterns allow us to identify the variances and covariance of νi. We use
this estimated variance-covariance matrix to integrate over the distribution of νi for the
households for whom we do not observe usage choices, primarily households on ﬂat-rate
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plans. This assumes that the distribution of the usage shock for the set of households
without usage data does not diﬀer from that for the remainder of the sample, allowing us
to extrapolate from the observed behavior of households. Table 9 describes the observed
plan and usage choices in the sample that we match to the model’s predictions. Overall,
54.2% of all households choose a metered plan, while 34.9% of households are on a ﬂat-
rate plan. For the 60% of households with recorded call data, we observe an average of
90.6 local calls and 15.1 intraLATA toll calls, with 62.1% of households not making any
intraLATA toll calls.
To estimate the parameters of the model, Θ, we match the households’ observed
behavior to the three sets of predictions generated by the model using a method-of-
moments estimator. The empirical moment condition for the discrete plan choice is
based upon a simulated scores estimator (see McFadden 1989, Hajivassiliou and McFad-
den 1998), which uses the score of each observation as an instrument in matching the
predicted choice probability to the actual choice. The empirical moment conditions that
we minimize are given by:
m¯I(Θ) =
1
I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
(Iij −E[πij ])sij (12)
m¯S(Θ) =
1
I −HS
I−HS∑
i=1
νˆiXi.
sij denotes the score, or the derivative of the log of the likelihood of the observa-
tion with respect to the parameter. Xi denotes the vector of instruments for the usage
decision, which includes all exogenous variables in the model, including the prices of each
of the plans, plan and household characteristics, and their squares. The optimal parame-
ters, which are obtained using a numerical minimization routine, minimize the objective
function:
Q(Θ) = m¯(Θ)′Wm¯(Θ), (13)
where m¯(Θ) is the column vector of moment conditions and W is the optimal
weighting matrix. The appendix contains a more detailed description of the estimation
algorithm.
5.3 Identiﬁcation
Parameters in our model are, in general, identiﬁed by both the discrete and the continu-
ous choice equations. The parameters of the demand function (a and b) are identiﬁed by
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variation in the observed data for households that have chosen a metered plan. Since in
the indirect utility function both a and b are multiplied by pj and their total eﬀect thus
varies by plan, we are able to estimate a single coeﬃcient on each of the household-level
variables included through Di and νi. The coeﬃcients on Di are identiﬁed by systematic
variation in usage for households with diﬀerent characteristics, while the covariance pa-
rameters ΣSν are pinned down by remaining unexplained variance in quantities of usage.
These allow us to measure how well the observable characteristics explain plan choices
and consumption by households. The eﬀect of the size of the calling area is identiﬁed by
variation in households’ locations within New York State.
The parameters in the perceived ﬁrm quality index are identiﬁed by variation in
household and ﬁrm characteristics for the entire sample of households. The λ parameters
are identiﬁed by variation in characteristics of each provider’s customers, relative to the
base category, Verizon households. These diﬀerent household/ﬁrm characteristics lead to
diﬀerent choices of ﬁrms’ plans by households even at equivalent prices across the ﬁrms.
The vector of ξ parameters measures the common component of households’ preferences
on a particular plan and is identiﬁed, as with any ﬁxed-eﬀect, by observing multiple
households choosing the same plan. Verizon is again the left-out category.
5.4 Results
Table 10 contains preliminary estimates of the model.34 Both local and intraLATA usage
demand are greater if the household has internet service or if it owns a cellular phone.
Usage of both services is also increasing in household size. The youngest cohort consumes
the most of both services but the middle age bracket consumes the least intraLATA toll.
Higher income households consume fewer local calls but more intraLATA calls than lower-
income households. Finally, the coverage area of a calling plan has a positive eﬀect on
local usage but a negative eﬀect on intraLATA toll although the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
Both types of service have downward-sloping demand and quite signiﬁcant price eﬀects.
The results for the households’ discrete choice are quite diﬀerent than those ob-
tained when estimating a probit model based on the discrete choice only because the
full model incorporates the eﬀect of the usage decision on the plan choice. The main
diﬀerence in the results is that the quality dummies for AT&T and MCI are now positive
rather than negative, indicating that, on average, households have a higher perceived
quality for these ﬁrms than for Verizon. Households that moved within the last year are
more likely to switch to AT&T or MCI while those who already receive a single bill from
Verizon are less likely to switch to one of the entrants consistent with some households
valuing a single bill for local and long distance service. Finally, households who have
AT&T as their long distance provider are signiﬁcantly more likely to switch to AT&T
34Note that these estimates do not use simulated scores as instruments and do not fully capture the
interaction between the plan-choice and usage errors.
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for local service but not to MCI, while households who have MCI for their long distance
service are more likely to switch to MCI for their local service but not to AT&T.
5.5 Consumer Welfare Gains from Entry
After estimating the model on our data of actual choices made by a random sample of New
York State households, we perform a counterfactual exercise of the welfare implications
if only the incumbent’s contemperaneous plans were available to the households. We
compute the indirect utility level that households achieve by choosing the optimal plan
available from Verizon and compare it to the indirect utility obtained under the full range
of choices. Preliminary estimates of the consumer welfare gains from entry under this
counterfactual are displayed in the ﬁrst row of Table 11.
The detailed demand model allows us to “decompose” this overall consumer wel-
fare change into price, quantity, quality, and convenience eﬀects, the four types of welfare
changes due to entry discussed above.35 This is not a strict decomposition because these
component welfare eﬀects are in general not orthogonal to each other and therefore not
additive. To estimate each of the eﬀects, we restrict the households’ options in a par-
ticular way and allow households to reoptimize their choices using the estimated utility
function parameters.
Allowing households to choose among the full range of plans, but abstracting from
quality diﬀerences between ﬁrms by setting the entrant-market dummies (the ξ’s) to zero
results in estimates of household-level indirect utility in the absence of quality diﬀerentia-
tion among ﬁrms. Utility gains relative to the baseline indirect utility levels quantify the
quality eﬀects from entry. The second row of Table 11 summarizes preliminary estimates
of these eﬀects.
To estimate the sum of price and quantity eﬀects, we evaluate the counterfactual
utility from allowing households to choose among the three providers, but assuming
that the providers oﬀer identical plan oﬀerings. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the change in
household indirect utility relative to the baseline under a counterfactual in which AT&T
and MCI oﬀer the same contemperaneous plans as Verizon. Preliminary estimates of
these combined price and quantity beneﬁts are listed in row three of Table 11. To
isolate the price and quantity eﬀects, we could hold the quantities predicted under this
counterfactual constant and reinstate AT&T and MCI’s plan oﬀerings. The indirect
utiltiy gains under this scenario would then represent the pure price eﬀect, while the
diﬀerence between the price eﬀect and the net price and quantity eﬀects would capture
the quanity eﬀect.
Preliminarily, we ﬁnd that overall welfare gains amount to $3.86, or 19.3% of the
35To the extent that Verizon introduces new plans as a result of the increased competition, this will not
be measured by our model. As we noted earlier, there was relatively little change in Verizon’s oﬀerings
in the period after entry until 2003.
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average Verizon bill, for the average household in the sample, with a standard deviation
of $5.00. The large variation in welfare gains conﬁrms the earlier results of signiﬁcant
heterogeneity in the extent to which households beneﬁt from entry. Price and quantity
eﬀects together total $2.28, or 10.2% of the average Verizon bill, while we estimate quality
eﬀects of $2.04 or 11.4%.
In future work, we plan on conducting a number of other counterfactual exercises
of interest. We can, for example, obtain indirect evidence on the convenience eﬀect by
quantifying the convenience eﬀect for Verizon customers who receive a single bill, which
is the only instance where we observe variation among the households. The change in
indirect utility if we allow a choice among the full range of plans, but exclude beneﬁts of
a single bill on Verizon by setting the diﬀerent long distance carrier/same bill dummies
(λ15 and λ25) to zero quantiﬁes the convenience eﬀects to Verizon households.
The current counterfactual analyses are based on Verizon’s contemperaneous plans,
assuming that Verizon’s pricing strategies have not been inﬂuenced by entry. To test the
sensitivity of our estimates to the regulators’ choices, we could also estimate the coun-
terfactuals using Verizon’s plans prior to entry. This assumes that the regulator would
not have changed the incumbent’s plans or pricing in the absence of entry.
As a second sensitivity test of the estimates, we also plan to perform the coun-
terfactual separately for households in areas in which AT&T entered in 1999 and for
households in the remaining Verizon territory. To the extent that AT&T endogenously
entered more attractive areas ﬁrst, based on unobservable household characteristics, con-
ducting the counterfactual for the sample as a whole may bias the resulting average
welfare gains.
6 Conclusion
A major goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act was to encourage entry into local
phone service with the objectives of achieving better alignment between prices and costs,
increased service quality, increased variety of service oﬀerings and eﬃciency gains in the
form of “one-stop shopping” across diﬀerent telecommunications services. In this paper,
we develop a model to carefully measure the eﬀect of each of these goals by evaluating its
eﬀect on consumer welfare. We develop an econometric model to decompose consumer
welfare eﬀects into price eﬀects, quantity eﬀects due to price changes, quality eﬀects
in the form of diﬀerentiated service providers and convenience eﬀects from receiving a
single bill for local and long-distance service. We apply this model to a random sample of
households in New York State to quantify the impact of entry in that state on consumer
welfare.
We ﬁnd evidence that on average consumers beneﬁted from price reductions due
to AT&T and MCI’s entry into local phone service and that consumption of local usage
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declined while intraLATA toll usage increased in response to these price changes. We
also ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that households beneﬁted from quality diﬀerences between
the incumbent’s services and the new entrants’ and from the convenience of receiving
a single bill for local and long-distance service while being able to choose its favorite
carrier for both. Preliminary counterfactual analyses suggest that the average household
in the sample beneﬁted by 19.3% in total from the additional plan and provider choices
introduced by the entrants.
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Table 1. Local Calling Plans
Obs
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (day x area)
Metered Tariﬀs – Fixed Fee1
AT&T FL overall 7.52 1.4216 6.50 9.50 N = 1400
Citizens FL overall 6.60 0 6.60 6.60 N = 1400
MCI FL overall 6.31 0.1591 6.27 6.99 N = 1400
Rochester FL overall 4.53 0 4.53 4.53 N = 1400
Verizon FL overall 6.81 0.7680 6.11 8.61 N = 2800
across geographic areas 0.0476 6.49 7.14 n = 2
within areas over time 0.7667 6.11 8.29 T = 1400
Metered Tariﬀs – Per-Call Prices
AT&T pL overall 0.10 0.0142 0.09 0.12 N = 1400
Citizens pL overall 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 N = 1400
MCI pL overall 0.10 0 0.10 0.10 N = 1400
Rochester pL overall 0.09 0 0.09 0.09 N = 1400
Verizon pL overall 0.09 0.0110 0.08 0.11 N = 2800
across geographic areas 0.0094 0.08 0.10 n = 2
within areas over time 0.0088 0.08 0.10 T = 1400
Flat-Rate Tariﬀs – Fixed Fee1
AT&T2 FL overall 21.45 1.5003 19.95 22.95 N = 2800
across geographic areas 2.1213 19.95 22.95 n = 2
Citizens FL overall 13.64 2.7083 8.64 20.00 N = 58520
across geographic areas 2.4084 9.98 20.00 n = 59
within areas over time 1.5925 8.64 18.09 T-bar = 992
MCI3 FL overall 20.18 1.9907 16.60 21.99 N = 2338
across geographic areas 2.1325 18.97 21.99 n = 2
within areas over time 1.3330 17.81 23.20 T-bar = 1169
Rochester FL overall 9.73 2.5282 6.23 16.40 N = 21000
across geographic areas 2.6169 6.23 16.40 n = 15
Verizon FL overall 15.92 2.7809 11.96 22.61 N = 7000
across geographic areas 2.9471 12.70 20.39 n = 5
within areas over time 0.8854 15.17 20.02 T = 1400
1 Lifeline customer discounts: AT&T – $4.60 discount oﬀ quoted ﬂat-rate tariﬀ rates; Citizens – $7
discount oﬀ quoted rates; MCI – $1 discount oﬀ quoted rates; Rochester – $1.75 discount prior to
August 1, 1998 and $4.70 discount afterwards oﬀ quoted ﬂat-rate tariﬀ rates; Verizon – $1 discount oﬀ
quoted metered rates, reduced ﬂat-rate tariﬀ prices ranging from $7.85 to $15.56, depending on location.
2 Flat-rate plans include 4500 minutes until March 2002 with a per-minute price for usage above 4500
minutes of $0.02 and unlimited minutes at zero per-minute prices afterwards.
3 Until Sept. 2000, MCI also oﬀered a hybrid local tariﬀ, which included 100 calls for $14.99 in non-metro
areas and $19.99 in metro areas and per-call rates for usage beyond 100 calls of $0.05.
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Table 2. Intra-LATA Calling Plans
Obs
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (day x area)
Metered Tariﬀs – Per-Call Prices
AT&T1 pT overall 0.32 0.0541 0.27 0.38 N = 2800
across geographic areas 0.0765 0.27 0.38 n = 2
Citizens pT overall 0.47 0 0.47 0.47 N = 1400
MCI pT overall 0.68 0 0.68 0.68 N = 1400
Rochester pT overall 0.73 0 0.73 0.73 N = 1400
Verizon pT overall 0.40 0.0831 0.27 0.54 N = 5600
across geographic areas 0.0298 0.37 0.44 n = 4
within areas over time 0.0790 0.23 0.54 T = 1400
1 From Nov. 2001 onwards, AT&T oﬀers in addition the expanded LATA calling plan, which bundles
local and intra-LATA toll usage at a ﬂat rate of $24.95 in metro areas and $27.95 in non-metro areas.
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Table 3. Comparison of TNS Sample and New York State Average
New York
TNS Sample State
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Average Size 2.141 2.61
Income (%)
Less than $10,000 11.41 11.50
$10,000 to $14,999 10.30 6.40
$15,000 to $24,999 15.95 11.70
$25,000 to $34,999 14.33 11.40
$35,000 to $49,999 14.63 14.80
$50,000 to $74,999 16.05 18.40
$75,000 to $99,999 9.18 10.60
$100,000 or more 8.14 15.30
Moved in Past 5 Years (%) 26.90 34.20
HOUSEHOLD LOCATION (%)
In Verizon Metro Region 48.09 44.61
In Verizon Territory 84.29 88.89
LOCAL CARRIER CHOICE (%, 2001)
ILEC 78.98 77.52
Verizon New York 63.82 67.43
CLEC 21.02 22.48
AT&T Local 12.24 11.77
MCI Local 5.40 5.58
1 Household size truncated at 5 or more members in the household.
Sources: TNS Telecoms; Census 2000; FCC, “Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2003”
(ILEC share); New York State PSC, “Analysis of Local Exchange Service Competition in New York
State,” Dec. 31 2001 (AT&T, MCI and Verizon shares).
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Table 5. Monthly Average Savings of CLEC
Customers over Verizon Local Service
N = 592 for AT&T, N = 218 for MCI
Total
Savings
Total over Percentage
Category Charge Verizon Savings*
Basic Charges on AT&T $23.25 -$0.26 -1.0%
Vertical Features Charges on AT&T 3.18 0.53 2.0%
Buying long distance from same company 0.89 3.3%
Total Savings 1.15 4.3%
(Std. Err.) (9.26)
Basic Charges on MCI $19.65 -$0.61 -2.9%
Vertical Features Charges on MCI 2.00 -0.06 -0.3%
Buying long distance from same company 1.07 5.1%
Total Savings 0.40 1.9%
(Std. Err.) (5.51)
* As percentage of average total Verizon charges ($26.69 for AT&T analysis, $20.98 for MCI
analysis).
Table 6. “Mistakes” Made by Households
Not Switching
Switching Switching to AT&T Within Within Within
to AT&T1 to MCI1 or MCI2 AT&T3 Verizon4 MCI5
Frequency 0.44 0.36 0.40 0.12 0.17 0.10
(Std. Err.) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.33) (0.37) (0.30)
Mean -0.22 -0.19 -0.14 -0.38 -0.23 -0.32
S.D. 0.44 0.19 0.11 0.30 0.16 0.23
Median -0.14 -0.10 -0.12 -0.47 -0.22 -0.40
Min -6.36 -0.90 -0.71 -0.78 -0.71 -0.49
Max -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.06
N 592 218 3981 42 1750 32
1 As fraction of what would have paid on Verizon.
2 As fraction of what would have paid on optimal AT&T or MCI plan.
3 As fraction of what would have paid on optimal AT&T ﬂat rate plan.
4 As fraction of what would have paid on optimal Verizon ﬂat rate plan.
5 As fraction of what would have paid on optimal MCI ﬂat rate plan.
41
Table 7. Probit Estimates of “Mistaken” Provider Choice
“Mistaken” Provider Choice Y/N
AT&T Customers MCI Customers Verizon Customers
Coeﬀ. Marg. Coeﬀ. Marg. Coeﬀ. Marg.
Variable (Std. Err.) Eﬀect# (Std. Err.) Eﬀect# (Std. Err.) Eﬀect#
INTERNET 0.1003 0.0394 0.2480 0.0891 0.1124 ∗∗ 0.0428
(0.1236) (0.2406) (0.0513)
CELLULAR -0.0712 -0.0279 -0.0263 -0.0094 0.1406 ∗∗∗ 0.0536
(0.1218) (0.2203) (0.0510)
HHSIZE -0.0282 -0.0111 0.3212 ∗∗∗ 0.1153 -0.1067 ∗∗∗ -0.0405
(0.0530) (0.1009) (0.0209)
INCOME -0.0290 -0.0114 -0.0395 -0.0142 0.0599 ∗∗∗ 0.0227
(0.0191) (0.0352) (0.0074)
AGE (15 – 34) -0.7495 ∗∗∗ -0.2601 -0.1768 -0.0614 0.0519 0.0198
(0.2321) (0.3606) (0.0775)
AGE (35 – 54) -0.1252 -0.0489 0.1391 0.0504 0.0618 0.0235
(0.1414) (0.2241) (0.0501)
MOVED1Y -0.8651 ∗∗∗ -0.285 -1.0462 ∗∗∗ -0.2636 -0.2725 ∗∗∗ -0.0983
(0.3580) (0.6943) (0.1050)
BLACK -0.7006 ∗∗∗ -0.246 0.2341 0.0874 0.8210 ∗∗∗ 0.3183
(0.2176) (0.3886) (0.0949)
HISPANIC -0.6582 ∗∗ -0.2303 -0.4803 -0.1525 0.6743 ∗∗∗ 0.2639
(0.3449) (0.5697) (0.1021)
RACEO 0.2013 0.0799 0.4570 0.1743 0.2190 ∗∗ 0.0851
(0.3455) (0.4692) (0.1027)
SAMLD -0.6738 ∗∗∗ -0.263 1.2367 ∗∗∗ 0.3257
(0.2571) (0.4730)
(1 - SAMLD)* -0.4946 -0.1805 1.5151 ∗∗∗ 0.5409 -0.0470 -0.0178
SAMBILL (0.3426) (0.6197) (0.0597)
N 592 218 3981
Log-Likelihood -367.7 -116.3 -2320.9
p-value 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000
Likelihood
Ratio Index 0.0947 0.1854 0.1325
Monthly dummies and a dummy for September and October 2001 included in the estimation. Dummy
variables are included to control for missing data for the MOVED1Y, SAMLD and SAMBILL variables.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. # For
discrete variables, marginal eﬀects refer to a discrete change from 0 to 1.
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Table 8. Multinomial Estimates of Switching to CLEC
Choice = AT&T Choice = MCI
Coeﬀ. Marginal Coeﬀ. Marginal
Variable Std. Err. Eﬀects # Std. Err. Eﬀects #
INTERNET -0.0752 -0.0054 -0.3828 -0.0061
(0.1340) (0.2337)
CELLULAR 0.0939 0.0075 -0.0094 -0.0003
(0.1282) (0.2175)
NYCITY -0.7183 ∗∗ -0.0488 -0.0546 0.0000
(0.2958) (0.4627)
HHSIZE 0.2563 ∗∗∗ 0.0200 0.1834 ∗ 0.0027
(0.0611) (0.1064)
NYCITY* 0.0399 0.0034 -0.1694 -0.0029
HHSIZE (0.1188) (0.2163)
INCOME -0.0972 ∗∗∗ -0.0076 -0.057 ∗ -0.0008
(0.0205) (0.0339)
AGE (15 – 34) 0.1934 0.0157 0.3036 0.0053
(0.2248) (0.3400)
AGE (35 – 54) 0.0039 0.0004 -0.0897 -0.0015
(0.1356) (0.2219)
MOVED1Y 0.1122 0.0094 -0.0969 -0.0017
(0.3156) (0.5539)
BLACK 0.509 ∗∗ 0.0483 -0.0982 -0.0024
(0.2274) (0.3970)
HISPANIC -0.6294 ∗∗ -0.0393 -0.4645 -0.0058
(0.2923) (0.5081)
RACEO -0.3597 -0.0271 1.1756 ∗∗∗ 0.0348
(0.3304) (0.4436)
ATTLD 3.047 ∗∗∗ 0.3526 -0.3956 -0.0118
(0.1507) (0.4333)
MCILD 0.0596 -0.0341 4.3002 ∗∗∗ 0.4224
(0.4139) (0.2469)
(1 - SAMLD)* -1.3762 ∗∗∗ -0.0742 -1.7875 ∗∗∗ -0.0173
SAMBILL (0.2148) (0.3528)
N 3164
Log-Likelihood -1350.35
p-value 0.0000
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.4055
The analysis is based on those households that live in an area where all three carriers oﬀered service
at the time of the household’s bill. Monthly dummies and a dummy for September and October 2001
included in the estimation. Dummy variables are included to control for missing data for the MOVED1Y,
SAMLD and SAMBILL variables.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level. ** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level. *** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. # For
discrete variables, marginal eﬀects refer to a discrete change from 0 to 1.
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Table 9. Household Plan and Usage Choices and Prices Paid
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Plan choices, metro regions
Metered plan 0.665 0.472 0 1 1899
Hybrid plan 0.141 0.348 0 1 1899
Flat-rate plan 0.148 0.356 0 1 1899
Exp’d LATA plan 0.045 0.208 0 1 1899
Plan choices, non-metro regions
Metered plan 0.461 0.499 0 1 2892
Hybrid plan 0.046 0.209 0 1 2892
Flat-rate plan 0.481 0.500 0 1 2892
Exp’d LATA plan 0.013 0.112 0 1 2892
Plan choices, overall
Metered plan 0.542 0.498 0 1 4791
Hybrid plan 0.083 0.277 0 1 4791
Flat-rate plan 0.349 0.477 0 1 4791
Exp’d LATA plan 0.026 0.158 0 1 4791
Usage of local service (# of calls)
qL, overall 90.610 106.520 1 1299 2876
qL, metered plans 89.872 95.121 1 857 2594
qL, other plan types 97.394 180.403 1 1299 282
Usage of toll service (# of calls)
% of households, qT = 0 0.621 0.485 0 1 4672
qT , overall 5.708 16.535 0 257 4672
qT |qT > 0 15.059 24.096 1 257 1771
Fixed fees and usage prices per call
F , overall 11.452 6.612 1.00 27.95 4791
F , other plan types 17.867 3.782 7.85 27.95 2195
F , metered plans 6.027 2.082 1.00 9.50 2596
pL, overall 0.083 0.029 0 0.12 2876
pT , overall 0.361 0.093 0 0.68 4672
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Table 10. Preliminary Parameter Estimates
Local Usage Toll Usage
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Demand Intercept (aS)
CONSTANT(αS) 3.3258 0.3588 2.7102 0.5058
INCOME (αSD,1) -0.0432 0.0490 0.0398 0.0540
INTERNET (αSD,2) 0.1120 0.1558 0.3343 0.5879
CELLULAR (αSD,3) 0.1771 0.3345 0.0321 0.9633
HHSIZE (αSD,4) 0.3937 0.1881 0.0226 0.0904
AGE (15 – 34) (αSD,5) 0.3634 0.8889 0.1161 0.4122
AGE (35 – 54) (αSD,6) 0.1917 0.3414 -0.0370 0.3499
COVERAGE(αSD,7) 0.0383 0.0340 -0.2169 0.3616
Demand Slope (bS)
CONSTANT (βS) 1.3118 0.6098 2.7370 0.5435
Covariance, unobservable household characteristic (ΣS)
σSaa 0.0038 3.0843 0.0079 1.2880
σSab 0.0035 0.0087 0.0035 1.2320
σSbb 0.0015 0.0103 0.0017 0.1492
Discrete Choice
Estimate Std. Err.
Choice = AT&T
MOVED1Y (λ11) 0.0054 1.5770
ATTLD (λ12) 4.7787 2.0392
MCILD (λ13) -0.0172 4.2559
(1-SAMLD)*SAMBILL (λ15) -2.5030 1.5784
ξATT (1stWAV E/METRO) 3.6171 2.3145
ξATT (1stWAV E/NON−METRO) 7.1755 1.5997
ξATT (2ndWAV E/METRO) 3.1915 1.9061
ξATT (2ndWAV E/NON−METRO) 5.0177 1.9530
Choice = MCI
MOVED1Y (λ21) 0.0027 0.3293
ATTLD (λ22) -0.8866 2.3530
MCILD (λ23) 4.7800 4.1001
(1-SAMLD)*SAMBILL (λ25) -2.8220 2.3628
ξMCI(PRE/1stWAV E/METRO) 4.1491 2.9819
ξMCI(PRE/1stWAV E/NON−METRO) 6.3182 1.8386
ξMCI(2ndWAV E/METRO) 4.7264 1.4324
ξMCI(2ndWAV E/NON−METRO) 4.1336 1.3700
N , households 4791
N , local usage 2876
N , intraLATA toll usage 4672
Dummy variables are included to control for missing data for the CELLULAR, MOVED1Y and SAM-
BILL variables.
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Table 11. Monthly Avg. Consumer Welfare Gains
Preliminary Counterfactual Analyses
Monetary Equivalent ($) % of Avg. Verizon Bill
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Overall welfare gains 3.861 5.002 19.3 25.1
Quality beneﬁts 2.040 1.938 10.2 9.7
Price and quantity beneﬁts 2.278 3.874 11.4 19.4
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Figure 1: Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, New York State
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Figure 2: AT&T’s Entry into Local Service, New York State, 1999
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Figure 3: Demand for Minutes of Local Telecom Service
Case 1 - Interior Solution on a Metered Plan
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Figure 4: Demand for Minutes of Local Telecom Service
Case 2 - Interior Solution on a Flat Rate Plan
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The utility function parameters are set to the following values: aL = 40, bL = 150 (case1), aL = 100,
bL = 600 (case2), aT = 100, bT = 600, and income y = 3000. For the ﬂat-rate plan, F equals 15,
pL = 0, and pT = 0.05. For the metered plan, F equals 20, pL = 0.15, and pT = 0.05. Consumption of
intraLATA toll minutes is held constant at the optimum value of 70 calls.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Estimation of Income
The TNS demogrpahic survey contains a categorical measure of annual household income, placing each
household into one of 16 income brackets. To transform these income categories into a single, empirically
more convenient measure, we assume that household income is distributed according to a log normal
distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. The parameters of the distribution are estimated
via maximum likelihood, weighing the probability of household income falling into each of the 16 income
categories by the frequency with which the category is observed in the data. The continuous income
for a household in a particular income category is then derived as the expected conditional value of
income for that category based on the estimated log-normal distribution. The resulting income levels
are presented in table A1.
Table A1. Parameter Estimates and Conditional Expected Values
Empirical Distribution of Household Income
Parameter Coeﬃcient Std. Error
µ 10.3712 0.0102
σ 0.9083 0.0083
N 8288
Log-Likelihood -22854.72
Expected
Income Category Frequency Income
0 – 7,500 511 5,099
7,500 – 9,999 434 8,755
10,000 – 12,499 472 11,239
12,500 – 14,999 382 13,732
15,000 – 19,999 583 17,409
20,000 – 24,999 739 22,401
25,000 – 29,999 595 27,400
30,000 – 34,999 593 32,403
35,000 – 39,999 442 37,406
40,000 – 44,999 423 42,410
45,000 – 49,999 348 47,413
50,000 – 59,999 630 54,673
60,000 – 69,999 400 64,698
70,000 – 74,999 300 72,428
75,000 – 99,999 761 85,887
≥100,000 675 154,315
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8.2 Estimation Algorithm
The estimation consists of using the demand model to predict each household’s optimal plan and quantity
choices and matching them to the household’s actual choices using a simulated method-of-moments
estimator. The estimation procedure works as follows:
1. Computing predicted plan choices and usage levels involves integrating over the distribution of
the household unobservables. Draw a vector of N errors from a trivariate standard Normal
distribution for each household. These values are held constant through all iterations of the
estimation routine and represent the errors we need to integrate over. We set N to 30.
2. Assume starting values for the parameters Θ0.
3. Compute the predicted plan choice probabilities and quantity errors for each household at the
current parameter estimates via simulation.
(a) Based on the household’s observed quantity choices, back out the household’s realization of
νi, νˆi, from equation 7 (procedure is written for local usage but procedure for intraLATA
toll usage is symmetric and is done simultaneously).
(b) Determine the household’s optimal consumption quantity on each plan:
i. Optimize within each hybrid plan:
A. Compute the optimal local usage on the plan based on equation 2 and using the
relevant per-unit price for consumption above the threshold q˜j .
B. If the optimal quantity is above the threshold then qL,nij equals the optimal quantity
based on the per-unit price.
C. If the optimal quantity is below the threshold then compute the optimal quantity
based on a zero per-unit price (equation 3). If the optimal quantity based on a
zero per-unit price is above q˜j then q
L,n
ij = q˜j . If the optimal quantity based on a
zero per-unit price is below q˜j then set q
L,n
ij based on equation 3.
ii. Compute the optimal quantity for all metered plans using 2 and for all ﬂat-rate plans
using 3.
(c) Compute the indirect utilities on each plan using the appropriate indirect utility function
from 4 and 5. Compute πij for all metered, ﬂat-rate and optimized hypbrid plans, condi-
tional on the household’s realization of νˆi.
4. Average across the N draws η-draws and, if necessary, ν-draws to obtain the expected plan choice
probabilities and demand error for each household and each plan. For households with observed
usage data, these equal:
E[πˆij ] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
πˆij(νˆi, ηni ) (14)
E[νˆSi ] =
1
N
N∑
n=1
νˆSi (η
n
i ) S = {L, T }.
For the remainder of the sample, the plan choice probability is:
E[πˆij ] =
1
N2
N∑
n=1
N∑
k=1
πˆij(νki , η
n
i ) (15)
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5. Interact the choice prediction error and quantity errors with the instruments, sij and Xi, and
average across households to obtain the empirical moment conditions:
m¯I(Θ) =
1
I
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
(Iij − E[πˆij ])sij (16)
m¯S(Θ) =
1
I −HS
I−HS∑
i=1
νSi Xi, S = {L, T },
Due to the assumption of extreme value errors, the score for observation i on plan j is a simple
linear expression in the choice probabilities, for example it equals the product of the prediction
error and the explanatory variables for parameters that enter the indirect utility function linearly.
6. Stack [m¯I(Θ), m¯L(Θ), m¯T (Θ)]′ to form m¯(Θ).
7. Update the parameters to minimize the minimum-distance objective function
Q(Θ) = m¯(Θ)′Wm¯(Θ), (17)
where W is the weighting matrix. Repeat steps 3) through 6) until convergence.
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